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Abstract 
The paper documents that for 1974-95 the Japanese non-fmancials' return on cost,  a measure 
ofreturn on (direct) investment, is consistently higher than their return on value (an estimate 
of  the expected return or cost of capital). Against conventional wisdom, when translated into 
USD terms, the  Japanese  cost of capital is  actually  higher than the  U.S.  counterpart.  The 
paper  further  shows  that as of the 90s the  main-bank  centered  keirestu  firms,  with  their 
internally disciplined corporate governance system,  lost their traditional  advantage  of lower 
cost of  capital, compared to the non-keiretsu firms. Examining corporate earnings, investment, 
and forms of  financing reveals that, in recent years, keiretsu firms have become more liquidity 
constrained than non-keiretsu firms.  Their investment drops  dramatically,  and  while  (also 
much reduced) retained cash earnings provide most of  the financing,  debt fmancing  is replaced 
by  more expensive new equity as the major source of outside financing.  Non-keiretsu finns 
are suffering as well, but to a lesser degree, and are still able to  finance their investment even 
with substantial short-term debts. The main-bank system seems starting to  crumble following 
an over-investment episode in late-80s. 
2 Japan's Corporate Returns on Value and Cost: A 
Comprehensive Look 
1.  Introduction 
An  important  issue  in  corporate finance  is  how  firms  perform under different systems  of 
corporate  governance  and  financing,  and  whether  one  governance  system  stands  out  as 
superior.  Under the  Anglo-American system,  firms  are  disciplined  at  arm's  length  by  the 
capital market, but in many countries the disciplining is done by  banks, and in a much more 
hands-on way.  Japan,  for  example,  has a  main-bank  system  in  which  reciprocal  holdings 
among business firms and main banks enable disciplining within the group (see Aoki, Patrick, 
and Sheard,  1994, for a comprehensive review on the  Japanese  main bank system).  In this 
introduction we briefly review the literature, and then outline the methodology and findings of 
the paper. 
1.1.  Pros and Cons of the Main-Bank system - the recent literature 
The success of Japan's economy during most of the postwar  period has greatly  stimulated 
academic interest in the merits of its  system, and many authors have related this success  to 
Japan's  bank-centered corporate-governance  structure.  For  example,  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and 
Scharfstein (1990a,b, 1991) find that, thanks to their close relationships with the main banks, 
Japanese firms have been less constrained by their internal  cash position,  allowing  them to 
continue their investments and growth even short of cash.  Comparing firms from Japan  and 
the US  (whose  governance  system  is  a natural rival  to  Japan's),  Prowse  (1990)  finds  that 
reciprocal holdings among the Japanese firms and banks greatly mitigate the agency problems 
between shareholders and debtholders. Kaplan and Minton  (1994)  and Kang  and  Shivdsani 
(1997) likewise confirm the positive role of  main bank in helping firms in financial difficulties. 
In a theoretical study, Berglof  and Perotti (1994) argue that the cross holding in the Japanese 
corporate governance structure also makes internal discipline more sustainable over time. 
In view of  the Japan's economic slump and persistently low stock prices in the  1990s, 
the more recent literature has naturally become more critical towards the country's governance 
system (see Allen, 1996, for a review on this reversal  of opinions).  Kang  and  Stulz  (1995) document that,  during the  1990-93  Japanese  stock-market slump,  fIrms  whose  bank  debt 
represent a larger fraction of their total debt invested less  and  produced  signifIcantly lower 
stock returns.!  Moreover,  Weinstein and Yafeh  (1998)  [md  that,  for  1977-86,  main-bank 
fIrms  exhibit lower profItability  and  growth as  well  as  a higher  cost of capital  relative  to 
unaffiliated fIrms.  They  interpret their fIndings  as  consistent with the  hypothesis  of rent-
extracting or "holdup" behavior of banks that  have  information monopolies on client fIrms 
(Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1991, and Houston and James, 1996). Also, the monitoring role of the 
main banks seems to have been quite  narrow in focus.  Morek and Nakamura (1998)  show 
that, for 1981-87, banker appointments in a fIrm's board of  directors more often took place in 
response to poor concurrent liquidity, and less as a reaction to lagging share values. 
Yet,  the  recent  outcry  against  main  banks  is  by  no  means  unanimous.  In  sharp 
contrast to  the  fmdings  by  Houston  and  James  (1996)  for  the  US  fIrmS,  Anderson  and 
Makhija (1999) observe that Japanese fIrmS  with higher growth potential took on more bank 
debt in  1985-89  and continued to  take  on more  bank debt in  1990, even though the  1989 
deregulation of the bond market should have facilitated bond issues. They conclude that, for 
fIrmS  where arms' -length debt would imply high agency costs, banks do provide monitoring 
benefIts and do not impose meaningful holdup cost. And while Gibson (1995) fInds  that,  in 
1991-92,  some banks in  Japan  did harm  their  client  fIrmS  by  hindering  investment,  such 
behavior seemed to  be restricted to  "weak" banks. Since, at that time, most big  banks were 
(viewed as) reasonably strong, Gibson still concludes that problems in the banking sector had 
no major impact on the Japanese economy. In short, the picture is by no means clear. In the 
next section we describe in more detail how we approach the issue. 
1.2.  Approach adopted in this paper 
The  lack of consensus about the pros  and  cons  of the  main-bank  system  and  the  mixed 
empirical results call for an examination that (i)  is  comprehensive,  (ii)  controls for the non-
governance-related aspects of capital markets, and (iii)  is  based on an analytical framework 
that provides a robust measure of corporate health. 
1 Kang and Stulz (1998) highlight the impact of the whole banking sector instead of the influence of the main-
bank relationship on the Japanese fInns during the economic slum and credit crunch. However, in  the context c:i 
Japan,  since the main-bank affiliated fIrms  usually  take  more  bank  loans,  they  interpret their fIndings  as  an 
adverse effect of  bank-centered corporate governance. 
4 In this  paper,  we attain  comprehensiveness  by  considering  all  listed  non-financial 
firms in Japan and by studying this  sample in a dynamic perspective over a 22-year period, 
1974-1995. Also, we examine not only the cost of capital and the return on investment but 
also the fluctuations of  corporate earnings, investment, and ways of  financing. 
The next item in our wish-list is the need for a ceteris paribus comparison. To study 
the  costs  and benefits  of corporate-governance  structures,  one  could  have  contrasted  the 
performance  of,  say,  the US and German firms.  Obviously,  however,  such  a  comparison 
would have brought in a host of other determinants of performance  other  than  corporate 
governance. To avoid such cross-country differences, we have chosen to compare two classes 
of firms  from one single country,  Japan.  Prowse  (1992),  among  others,  stresses  that  the 
corporate governance system in Japan is far more heterogeneous than is often believed. Next 
to the (main-bank centered) keiretsu system, with significant shareholdings in business firms 
by banks, there also  is a  system  closer to  the  Anglo-American tradition,  with firms  much 
more subject to the capital market discipline.  This  heterogeneity provides  a well-controlled 
test  ground for the two  governance  systems,  in  that  it eliminates  the  possible  effects  of 
capital market segmentation  as  well  as  differences  in accounting  and  tax  rules  and  other 
institutional factors that would have hampered an international comparison. Thus,  for most 
part of  our analysis in the paper we separate the Japanese non-financial firms in two  groups, 
keiretsu  firms  (that  is,  companies  closely  affiliated  with  the  Big  Six  main-bank-centered 
industrial groups), and non-keiretsu firms  (members that  are  very  weakly  affiliated,  or not 
affiliated)  . 
Lastly, regarding our analytical framework about corporate  health,  we  follow  a new 
approach  suggested in Fama and  French  (1998)  (hereafter  FF).  As  explained  in  the  next 
section,  we  first  use  the  spread  between  the  "IRR  on  cost"  (or  corporate  return  on 
investment) and the "IRR on value"  (or cost of capital) at the corporate-sector level  as  our 
first-pass  measure of corporate.  If a  system  of corporate  governance  lowers  the  cost  of 
capital, it will stimulate investments and profits.  However, the spread (or value added) that 
we use as the first-pass measure of corporate profitability is subject to  substantial estimation 
problems. To circumvent these, in a second stage we also look at the dynamics of corporate 
earnings, investment, and fmancial decisions, which help diagnose more accurately the state of 
health of Japan's corporate sector. In the next section, we summarize our main findings. 
5 1.3.  Contributions of the paper 
One  contribution of the  paper  is  that  we  use the  FF  (1998)  IRRs  on  cost  and  value  as 
measures of the estimates of investment profitability  and,  particularly,  the  cost· of capital. 
Other studies (McCauley and Zimmer, 1989, and Frankel, 1991, and others) have used as the 
cost of capital the traditional weighted average of cost of capital (W  ACC) with various (and 
sometimes  rather ad  hoc)  inputs,2  and their measures of corporate  investment  returns  are 
largely accounting ratios. 
Our use of  the IRRs not just represents a new way of  addressing the governance issue, 
but also provides an international comparison to FF's US results. Japan is a natural choice for 
a robustness  check because  it has the second largest stock  market by  capitalization in  the 
world.  We  fmd  that,  in  our  1974-95  sample period, the  Japanese  non-financial  firms  as  a 
whole did add value. Like in FF (1998), this conclusion is not sensitive to  whether or not the 
sample ends in a gloomy  stock  market,  but when we  move  backward the  termination date 
from  1995 to  1985, spreads between delivered and required return decline  fast  towards  the 
end of  the period. Interestingly, when we convert our Japanese returns into USD returns, the 
Japanese cost of capital becomes higher than the  US  one.  Thus,  the  often-heard claim that 
Japan's cost of  capital is much below the levels elsewhere in the world may be based more on 
a numeraire effect rather than anything real. 
The  main contribution  of the  paper,  however,  is  that  we  provide  a  dynamically 
viewed and robust evaluation on the two  governance  structures:  the  main-bank  system  and 
the capital-market-disciplined system, over the period 1974-95, a period that contains drastic 
changes  in  Japan's  financial  environment  following  its  financial  deregulation.  The  current 
gloomy state of the Japanese  economy suggests that  the  main-bank  system  may  not have 
been  up  to  its  monitoring  task.  Perhaps  the  system  has  been  eroded  by  the  financial 
deregulation, but we also provide indications that it may have collapsed under the weight of 
its  own past  mistakes.  From our analysis,  the  main-bank seemed to  do  well  before  1990: 
consistently with traditional beliefs, the cost-of-capital gap between keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
firms remained in favor of the  former.  Since the  early  90s,  however,  not  only  the  keiretsu 
firms'  advantage of a lower cost of has disappeared. In addition, over the entire period their 
2  The methodology in Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) is  markedly different from  others.  Their cost of capital gap 
between keiretsu and non-keiretsu is  derived from their model.  However, their model does rely on a discount 
rate of  the WACC type. 
6 realized corporate returns  on investment have  been  lower  than  for  non-keiretsu  fIrms.  In 
addition,  we  fmd  that  the  keiretsu  fIrms'  benefIt-cost  spread  has  been  consistently 
lower-and, as of 1990, declined faster-than the non-keiretsu value added. 
The  disappearing  cost-of-capital  advantage  and  the  dwindling  benefIt-rninus-cost 
spread for keiretsu fIrms may indicate a weakening of the once-hallowed main-bank system. 
To  pin down what went wrong, we examine the history  of corporate  earnings,  investment, 
and ways of  fInancing. We observe that, during 1991-95, both keiretsu and non-keiretsu fIrms 
reduced their investments and abandoned the Myers  (1984) natural pecking order of external 
fInancing and issued large amounts of costly equity.  Upon  closer inspection,  keiretsu fIrms 
tended  to  use  the  new funds  to  reduce  short-term  bank  debt,  while  non-keiretsu  fIrms 
continued to borrow short-term from banks. In addition, keiretsu fIrms went much further in 
cutting their investments, and relied almost exclusively on (also much reduced) retained cash 
earnings to fInance the remaining investments. In contrast, non-keiretsu fIrms (which tend to 
be  smaller  and  have  higher  growth)  invested  relatively  more,  and  relied  less  on retained 
earnings and more on bank debt to fInance their investments. Thus, the keiretsu fIrms' equity 
issues at a time of  recession suggest difficulties in debt (re-)fInancing, that is, severe liquidity 
constraints that were caused probably by the past over-investment and a debt overhang. We 
indeed fmd that free cash flows were on average negative, even more before 1990s than after, 
and that keiretsu fIrms  tend to  suffer more  from  this  than  non-keiretsu  fIrms.  Thus,  the 
bottom line is that keiretsu fIrms have faced  higher fmancial  costs  because they  were  more 
liquidity constrained.  This  diagnosis  is  consistent with our results  from  the  IRRs.  It  also 
contradicts the usual view that main-bank monitoring prevents  over-investments and helps 
solving liquidity constraints. Lastly, the diagnosis provides no evidence that the  rise  of the 
cost of capital is  due to  rent-extraction by  main banks:  such hold-up  behavior would have 
been even more natural with  respect to  the  non-keiretsu  fIrms  which,  being  smaller,  face 
higher costs of  public fmancing. 
The  remainder  of the  paper  IS  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  FF's 
estimation method of  the IRRs. Section 3 discusses the data and the sample issues concerning 
the  Japanese  fIrms.  Section  4,  estimates  and  explains  the  IRRs.  Section  5  analyzes  the 
Japanese  corporate  earnings,  investment,  and  fInancing  decisions,  statically  as  well  as 
dynamically. Section 6 concludes. 
7 2.  The IRR on value and the IRR on cost 
By definition, the IRRs are discount rates that make the total present value of cash flows into 
and out of a project equal to zero.  FF  (1998)  suggest to  calculate the IRRs of a corporate 
sector by treating the entire corporate sector as a single investment project. Technically, the 
IRRs on value and cost are the discount rates, ry and re, that solve 
T(1995)  X  I  T(1994) FS - FBV  TV, 
IV,  =  E  1  ':t  E  1  1 :t  1995 
o  1=1  (1 +f'j  1=1  (1 +  rv y  (1 + rj 
(1) 
and 
T(1995)  X  I  T(1994) FS - FBC  TV 
ICo =  E  1  1  +  E  1  1 +  1995 
1=1  (1 +,-j  1=1  (1 + J;;)'  (1 + reY 
(2) 
All variables in (1) and (2) are defmed as in FF (1998). IV  0 is the aggregate initial market value 
of  firms that enter the sample at the beginning of  the estimation period (that is,  1974). In (2), 
ICo is their aggregate initial book value. Xt is aggregate cash earnings (after-tax earnings before 
deduction of  interest and depreciation) for year t for the firms that were in the sample in year 
t-l. It is the aggregate gross investment (net investment plus depreciation) of these firms.  FSt 
(firms sold during year t) is the terminal market value of  fIrms that leave the sample in year t. 
FBVt (fIrmS bought at value) is the initial market value of  fIrms that enter the sample in t,  and 
FBCt (firms bought at cost) is their book value. Lastly, TV1995  is the terminal market value of 
firms that still exist at the end of  the sample period (1995). 
As mentioned, we follow FF's  (1998)  definitions.  This  may  cause  problems in  the 
case of cash balances, which are relatively large in Japan.  In this  study  (as  in other work), 
cash holdings are treated as part of  assets, even though some of  them are really compensatory 
balances (buzumi-ryodate deposits) rather than true working capital. We have not attempted 
remove the compensatory balances from working capital (at the asset side) and bank debt (at 
the liability side) because we see no reliable way to  do  S03, and for comparability with most 
3 In principle, we could have estimated the compensating-balance component of  the cash holdings by regression 
of Cash on short- and long-term debt. The estimated compensating balances could then have been deducted from 
the amounts  of debt,  rather than being included into  working  capital.  However,  the  data  are,  a priori,  quite 
likely  to  be  non-stationary,  so  that  estimates  from  19  yearly  data  points  are  statistically  very  suspect.  In 
addition, the true compensatory balance coefficient changes across finns  and over time.  Lastly, the existence of 
compensatory balances also lowers the  need of true working capital-that is,  deducting compensatory balances 
8 published research on Japanese corporations. Still, we have rerun all computations below by 
treating  changes  in  cash  as  a  separate  source/use  of funds  rather  than  part  of overall 
investment and so on. As most of the time we see little effect, these results are available on 
request rather than included in the text.  In the one  instance  where  the  treatment  of cash 
matters, we discuss these additional computations. 
Since the "investment project" represents the entire corporate sector, individual fIrms 
enter and leave  the "project"  at different times.  For the  IRR on value  in  (1),  the  initial 
investment in a fIrm is its market value when it enters the sample (IV  0 or FBVt).  For the IRR 
on cost, the initial investment in a fIrm is the cost of the  assets  the  firm  brings  in when it 
enters the sample (ICo or FBCt). The remaining cash flows in (1) and (2) are the same for the 
two IRRs: the annual net cash flows (Xt-It), the terminal market values for firms (either FS(, 
when they leave the sample early, or TV  1995 at the end of  the sample period). 
The IRR on value is the return to an investor who (i) buys firms at market value (IV  0 
or FBVt) when they enter the sample, (ii) receives or provides their subsequent net out- or 
inflows (Xt - 10, and (iii) ultimately sells them at the 1995 market value (FSt or TV  1995)' By 
the flow-of-funds identity, the fInn's net intermediate cashflow (Xt - It) equals its net payout 
of  dividends and interest (Divt + Intt) minus issues of  new securities (NSt). Thus, equation (1) 
can be rewritten as 
1'(1995)Div  +Int -NS  1'(1994)FS  -FBV  TV, 
IV =  E  '  ,  '+ E  '  , +  1995 
o  ,=1  (l+rv)'  ,=1  (1+1;,)'  Cl+rS'  (3) 
Equation (3)  interprets  the IRR on value  as the compound return on all  securities  of the 
aggregate  frrm that were outstanding  during  the  IRR estimation  period.  All  securities  are 
purchased (at market value) when fIrms enter the sample (IV  0 or FBV  0.  Later on in their life, 
fIrms either issue more securities (NSt> 0) or retire securites (NSt < 0), depending or whether 
or not cash earnings Xt are below the sum of investment outlays It plus dividend and interest 
payments,  Divt  +  Intt.  Being  a  long-term  average,  this  realized  return  on  all  securities 
estimates the overall cost of capital for the aggregate fmn.4 If we measure the investments at 
cost instead of  at market value, we obtain an estimate of  the return on corporate investment. 
probably leads to a level of  working capital that is lower than what it would have been if banks had not insisted 
on compensatory balances. 
4 The interpretation of  IRR on value as the compound return on the aggregate firm should not  be  confused with 
the compound return (CR) on the value-weighted market portfolio. The CR measures the return from investing a 
dollar in the market portfolio at the beginning of  the sample period, and then simply rolling over the investment 
9 3.  Data 
Our Japanese data are retrieved from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets  (PACAP) databases 
developed by the Sandra Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin Capital Markets  Research Center at the 
University of  Rhode Island. The annual data on balance sheets and financial  statements cover 
the 22 fiscal years  1974 to  1995. Most  Japanese finns have  a fiscal  year  ending in  March. 
Thus, fiscal year 1974 runs from April 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975, and so on. 
We select all non-financial finns that have (annual) data on market and book value for 
at least two consecutive years. As in FF (1998), the capital stock of firms includes only debt 
that pays explicit interest (PACAP's long-term loans and debentures plus short-term loans in 
current liabilities). Non-interest-bearing liabilities, mainly accounts  payable,  are  not  added 
because  most  of them  cancel  out  after  consolidation  into  a  industry- or  economy-wide 
aggregate. Their simple sum, without taking into account the intra-industry AlP, would have 
grossly overestimated their net value. 
Given their distinct main-bank-centered industry, we are particularly interested in the 
SIX  major  Japanese  industrial  groups,  the  so  called  keiretsu-the  Mitsui,  Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo,  Fuyo,  Sanwa,  and DKB groups.  Keiretsu membership  as  a key  feature  of the 
Japanese  economy is  very  stable  over time.  However, there  is no  unified  classification  of 
keiretsu  membership  in  the  literature.  The  keiretsu  firms  in  our  sample  either  meet  the 
classification by Nakatani (1984), or are the closely-linked members (with the degree of the 2-
,3-, and 4-star inclination) to the six groups as classified in the  1992/93  edition of Industrial 
Groupings  in Japan - the Anatomy of  the  "keiretsu".  On  the  other hand,  our non-keiretsu 
firms are either the unaffiliated finns or the weakly related members (a I-star affinity to the 
Six Groups). 
Table 1 shows some summary statistics for the sample. Over the 22 years  1974-95, 
the average number of non-fmancial firms  present  per year is  1337, of which the  keiretsu-
affiliated firms account for 38.8 percent. This is an average; in fact, the keiretsu importance in 
terms of numbers has been dropping from 41.5 percent in the second half of 1970s  to  36.1 
percent in the first half of 1990s. 
into the new  market portfolio as  available in  each subsequent year.  In  contrast, the IRR on  value requires net 
new investment whenever cash earnings Xt are less than investment outlays It (see the more detailed explanation 
in  FF,  1998). 
10 It is well known that equity cross-holdings among business are widespread in Japan. 
From Table 1, the average cross-holdings in each year amounts to  20.1  percent of the  total 
market equity of all non-financial firms,  or 11.1  percent of their  total  market capital  (book 
debt plus market equity).  Since the start of deregulation of the financial markets in Japan in 
mid-70s, equity cross holdings have steadily decreased, from 21.5 percent of equity in 1974-
79 to  16.6 percent in 1991-1995, indicating that the main-bank system is retreating (see e.g. 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990b, for a similar conclusion). The temporary  increase of 
the alternative measure, cross holdings divided by total value, during the "bubble" years  1986-
90 merely reflects the increase of  equity values relative to debt values during that period.5 
Cross holdings among business firms induce double-counting, and therefore exaggerate 
the  value  of the aggregate  capital  stock of the  corporate.  We  purge the  inflating  effect  of 
equity cross-holdings in the same way as French and Poterba (1991): aggregate market equity 
is multiplied by (l-K), where K is the ratio of aggregate cross holdings to-equity;  and total 
market value is multiplied by (I-H), where H is the ratio of cross holdings to  total value. For 
aggregate book values we correct for double-counting using the same ratios as for the  market 
values.  For the  adjustments  in the  subgroups,  like  keiretsu  and  non-keiretsu,  we  use  the 
average ratio because more accurate information is not available to  us.  While  this  somewhat 
overstates (understates) the capital stock of keiretsu (non-keiretsu) firms, the impact on our 
conclusions is probably minimal. 
Table ralso shows that the average market and book capital of all non-financial firms 
increases over the sample period. Their grand averages are 242.7 trillion Yen of market value 
and 139.0 trillion of book value. Keiretsu firms account for over half of the total market and 
book  value  before  1986,  but  their  average  market  value  drops  below  50%  afterwards, 
indicating  again that the keiretsu dominance  has  been  waning.  The  fact  that,  in  terms  of 
numbers, keiretsu firms represent considerably less than half of all firms while they  provide 
roughly half of  the value of  the firms in the  sample of course implies that keiretsu firms tend 
to be larger than non-keiretsu firms .. 
5  The  Japanese  stock market crash following  the  bubble  years  happened  in  1990.  Including  that  year  in 
subperiod 1986-90 is merely a consideration of  cutting the total sample into sub-samples of equal (five) years as 
FF (1998) did. In fact, as can seen also in the rest of  the paper, the effect of  the bubble years when we look at the 
averages for 1985-90 is not qualitatively influenced by the inclusion of 1990.  Likewise, the results of averaging 
that hold for 1991-95 are also valid for 1990-95. 
11 As mentioned before, the advantage of comparing keiretsu versus non-keiretsu is that 
it  eliminates  a  host  of  other  factors  that  would  have  obscured  an  international 
comparison-say,  the  US  versus  bank-centered  Germany.  Still,  the  observed  differences 
between keiretsu and non-keiretsu could partly be due to  industry  effects.  As  we  see  from 
Table 2, however, there seems to  be  little sector  bias.  With  the  exception of the  service 
industry (which accounts for little in terms of  book or market capital anyway) and especially 
the regulated sectors (agriculture, utility, transportation, and communication), keiretsu always 
accounts for between 40 and 70 percent of the total in every industry.  A closer look at the 
regulated sectors reveals that there is no keiretsu presence in the sub-sectors of utilities and 
communications, and that the communications sector is dominated by a single,  gigantic,  and 
quite  atypical  firm,  NTT.  To  avoid  a  regulated-sector  (and  NTT)  bias  and  obtain  a  fair 
comparison between keiretsu and non-keiretsu, we exclude  the  utility  and  communication 
sectors from our sample of non-keiretsu firms  whenever we  split  up  the  total  sample  into 
keiretsu and non-keiretsu.6. 
4.  Estimation of IRRs 
In this section, we use the joint measures of  the IRRs on cost and value to gauge the Japanese 
corporate health over 1974-95 in general, and to fmd out whether (and as of when) corporate 
health has been evolving differently across keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms. 
Panel A of  Table 3 shows the estimates ofIRR on value and cost, nominal and real, in 
Japanese Yen (JPY) and US  dollar (USD), of all Japanese  non-flnancials  (keiretsu and  non-
keiretsu firms) for 1974-95. The annual values of  the cash flows that underly the real IRRs of 
all non-fInancials, keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms are in Table 4.  We do  not face  a multiple 
IRR problem, for the same reason as in FF (1998).When denominated in JPY, the estimate of 
IRR on nominal value of  all non-fInancials is 8.01 percent and the estimate of IRR on nominal 
cost is 11.34 percent. Thus, on average the Japanese non-fmancial corporate sector has added 
value over the past two decades at a rate of  3  .33 percent per year. Adjusting the cash flows  in 
(1) and (2) for inflation only lowers both legs of the cost-benefit spread (to  4.95  versus 7.94 
6  But not when we describe the  sample as a whole (all non-fmancials). Thus,  occasionally, the  existence of a 
third group (utilities and communications) means that a number for the sample as a whole is  not  in  between the 
corresponding numbers for keiretsu and non-keiretsu. 
12 percent, respectively) and does not  materially  influence the  spread  itself (3  percent  in real 
terms). 
Panel A of  Table 3 also shows estimates ofIRR on value and cost of  keiretsu and non-
kereitsu firms.  Over the entire period, non-keiretsu firms have added  more percentage  value 
than keiretsu firms.  Both legs of the spread contribute positively to  this result: non-keiretsu 
firms  had not only  a lower cost of capital  (IRR on value:  8.61  versus  9.07  percent,  and 
adjusted  for  inflation,  5.56  versus  5.71  percent)  but  also  a  higher  return  on  corporate 
investment (IRR on cost:  11.74 versus  11.26, and after inflation, 8.42 versus  7.73  percent). 
This  runs  counter to  the  traditional  perception that keiretsu  firms,  with  their  main-bank-
centered corporate governance structure, enjoy lower agency cost in borrowing  and  hence  a 
lower cost of capital. However, in our discussion, below, about the  evolution over time  we 
shall  see  that the  1974-1995 average  is  heavily  influenced  by  the  (rather  atypical)  slump 
years; the earlier periods do conform to the common perceptions. Before proceeding with the 
evolution over time,  we  address  some  issues regarding  our  IRR estimates:  translation  into 
USD; the link between IRR, cost of  capital, and simple returns; and the sensitivity of the IRR 
estimates to each of  the cash flow components . 
4.1  Translating the IRRs into usn 
To compare with FF's results and check the common perception that Japan's cost of  capital is 
low by  international standards, we need to translate the above JPY-based figures into  USD. 
Thus,  we  translate  all cash flows  into  USD  at  the  contemporaneous  spot  rate,  and  then 
compute an USD-based IRR.7  In Panel A of Table 3, when rotated into USD, the estimates 
of  the IRR on value and on cost for  all Japanese non-fmancials both increase by  very  similar 
amounts-roughly,  the  average  per  annum  appreciation  of JPY-to  13.24  and  16.89 
respectively.  The estimates in real  terms  are  7.63  and  10.86 percent.  These  estimates  are 
7 An implicit assumption of this  translated-cash-flow approach is  that capital markets are integrated,  otherwise 
the buying and selling of  Japanese assets at any desired date is  impossible.  In  reality, however, the opening-up 
of Japan's capital market really started only  in  early  80s  (and slowly  so,  at  that).  A  second problem  is  the 
assumption that the long-term realized evolution of  the exchange rate is close to the expectations. (This problem 
of  course applies also for any other variable in this model, e.g. stock prices and CPI  levels.) The latter problem 
is solved if, instead of  valuing the project as such, we value the project hedged against exchange risk. Under this 
approach, the USD-based return on the hedged asset is, a priori, roughly equal to the JPY -based return plus  the 
difference  between  the  USD  and  IPY  risk-free  rates.  While  this  second  approach  avoids  the  problem  of 
estimating the expected exchange-rate change, we now run into the problem of  how to identify "the" risk-free rate 
in a sample  covering 22  years and having non-flat term structures at  all  dates.  Thus,  we have chosen the first 
approach. 
13 larger than the  US numbers in FF  (1998).8  It turns  out  that  the  conventional  claim  that 
Japan's cost of  capital is much below that elsewhere in the world (for example, McCauley and 
Zimmer, 1989) is confounded by a numeraire effect. 
4.2  Cost of Capital: IRR on Value, Average Simple and Compound Returns 
How the true cost of capital is to be estimated depends on whether one is interested in the 
cost of capital per se or in the corresponding PV factor. An unbiased but noisy  estimate of 
the expected return does not lead to an unbiased estimate of the present value because the 
latter is a non-linear function of  the expected return (Fama, 1994). As a result,  estimates of 
cost of  capital that produce unbiased estimates of  present values tend to be geometric average 
returns, with weights that are either equal or are related to the maturity  of the future  cash 
flows to be discounted (Blume, 1974, and Cooper, 1994). 
We briefly relate and  compare the  competing measures.  We  start  from  the  simple 
(gross) return for year t, 
(4) 
where VI_I and Vt are the market values of  the same firms for the end year t-1  and t,  and Xt - It 
is the net cash flow The equally-weighted arithmetic mean of the simple year-by-year returns 
provides an unbiased estimate of  the expected annual return.  In contrast, if the purpose is to 
obtain an unbiased estimate of  the present value, 11E(R)n, one naturally turns to the equalIy-
weighted geometric mean of  all year-by-year simple returns. The IRR on value, lastly, is also 
a geometric average but uses unequal weights, namely, 
(5) 
That is, the weight for the year-t return is the invested wealth at the beginning of the year, Vt_ 
I>  discounted to the beginning  of the sample period at the IRR on value.  Thus,  a negative 
return between times t-l and t  tends to  obtain a larger weight than a subsequent positive 
return because Vt- 1 is smaller than Vt, so that a fortiori PV(Vt-l) is smaller than PV(V  J. As a 
8 They find that, for the US non-fmancials, the nominal and real IRRs on value are  11.78  and 5.57 percent and 
14 result,  an IRR tends  to  be  smaller than  an  unweighted  compound  return  (which,  being  a 
geometric mean, is smaller than the arithmetic average). 
The  choice  between  the  two  compound  returns  depends  on  the  purpose  of the 
application. FF (1998) argue that the geometric mean of  simple returns, which treats  all years 
in the same way, is probably a better choice for a cost of  capital than is the IRR on value. On 
the other hand, the IRR on value takes into account the size of the interim in- and outflows, 
and therefore is a more accurate estimate of the realized return on all  wealth allocated  over 
time to the corporate sector as a whole. Since our main purpose  in this section is to  obtain a 
measure of  corporate health rather than an unbiased estimate of present value, we follow FF 
and chose the IRR on value as  our main yardstick Gointly with the IRR on cost, which is a 
measure of  the merits of  projects). Still, it is interesting to know to what extent the  results are 
affected by the choice of  the averaging process. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows  estimates of the average simple and compound returns (in 
nominal or real, JPY or USD) for all non-fmancials, and for  keiretsu and  non-keiretsu fIrms 
separately.  The  simple  averages  are,  predictably,  greater  than  the  geometric  means.  For 
example,  the  simple  average  returns  in  nominal  JPY  are  8.96  (all  non-fInancials),  9.44 
(keiretsu), and 9.75 percent (non-keiretsu), all of which are 0.5  to  1 percent higher than the 
corresponding geometric means, 8.51, 8.97, and 9.14 percent.  The IRRs on value, in turn, are 
again lower than the geometric  means,  although the  difference is smaller.  For  example,  our 
estimates of the IRR on value in real JPY are  4.95  (all  non-fInancials),  5.71  (keiretsu),  and 
5.56  percent (non-keiretsu),  and these  numbers  are  less  than  0.5  percent  lower  than  the 
corresponding geometric means, which are 5.38, 5.83, and 5.99 percent. 
Disturbingly,  according  to  both  simple  and  geometric  means  the  keiretsu  cost  of 
capital  is  lower  than  the  non-keiretsu  cost  of capital  (recall  that  the  the  IRR  on  value 
suggested otherwise). Equally disturbingly, the numbers are heavily dependent on the  initial 
market-to-book and the fInal market value, as we shall see in the next section. In short, there 
is  a serious estimation  problem  here.  We  do  not  have  a  sampling  error  variance  for  the 
compound returns,  so  we  follow  FF  (1998)  and  use  the  variance  for  simple  returns  as  a 
proxy.  Panel B of Table  3 shows the  standard errors  of the  simple  average  over 22 years 
(1994-95).  The  standard  errors of the  average  of simple  nominal  JPY returns  for  all  non-
the nominal and real IRRs on cost are 13.97 and 7.52 percent for 1973-96. 
15 fmancial,  keiretsu, and non-keiretsu firms  are 2.20, 2.27, and 2.56 percent, very close to the 
standard  errors of the  average  of simple real  lPY returns,  which are  2.27,  2.37,  and  2.60 
percent.9  In view of  this, it seems prudent to take all IRR-based inferences as  indicative, and 
to look at other evidence for confirmation. 
4.3  Relative Importance ofthe Various Cash Flows That Determine the IRRs 
Initial asset values, earnings, investment outlays,  securities issued or redeemed, and terminal 
values  jointly  determine  the  IRRs  on  value  and  cost.  We  want  to  assess  the  relative 
importance of the initial, terminal, and intermediate cash flows  as  determinants  of the  IIRs. 
Table 5 reports the weights of  these intermediate inflows and outflows by cumulating them to 
the  terminal year  1995  at  each of the  four  IRRs  (nominal  or  real,  on  value  or  cost)  and 
expressing them as a percentage of  TV 1995. 
As could already be guessed from Table 4, Table 5 shows that firms make heavy post-
entry  investments.  For  example,  capitalized at the  nominal  IRR on cost  for  1974-95,  the 
cumulative  value  of annual  post-entry  investment for  non-financials  is  2.15  times  TV1995. 
Much of  this investment is, however, offset by annual cash earnings, whose capitalized value 
is  2.55  times of TV1995.  As  a result,  the  capitalized value  of annual  net  cash  flows  from 
operations, Xt - It>  amounts to just 39 percent of TV 1995. The weight of cumulative value of 
annual assets sold at either cost or value is tiny (around 2 percent of TV 1995) because only a 
very small number of firms left our sample. Lastly, the impact of the initial assets at cost is 
relatively large: its cumulative final value amounts to 1.41 times TVI995. 
As  can be  verified from  Table  4,  also  in  real terms  and  for  each of the  subgroups 
(keiretsu and  non-keiretsu)  the  relative  importance  of cash  inflows  and  outflows  always 
follows  a  similar  pattern  as  the  one  we  described.  The  most  important  cash  flow  that 
contributes to the IRRs always is initial assets.  The terminal value of assets in  1995  comes 
second, and the 22-year stream of net cash flows  from operations, Xt  - It>  is a distant third. 
Table 4 shows that the market value of entering firms  (IVa  or FBV d is  always  higher than 
their cost (lCa  or FBCt). Given the large weight of initial assets in the total picture, the result 
9  On the bright side, the similarity of the nominal- and real-term standard deviations indicates that variation in 
inflation contributes little to the variation in the Japanese corporate nominal returns over the past 22 years, and 
that the conclusions in this paper do not depend on whether we use nominal and real returns. 
16 that the  IRR on cost  is  in  all cases  greater than the IRR on value  stems  largely from  the 
market  -to-book ratio of  initial assets. 
While the market value of  initial assets is subject to little dispute, one might have more 
misgivings about our measure of  cost of  initial assets. A downward bias is likely here, for two 
reasons,  First,  we  estimate  the  cost  of an  entering  firm  by  its  book value,  which  in  an 
inflationary environment tends to be underestimate the replacement cost.  Second,  the  post-
entry  investments in R&D, advertisement, and human capital  are  expensed;  thus,  pre-entry 
investments in these intangible assets do not show up in book assets. 
The question is how large the  measurement error in cost can be  without  overturning 
our conclusion that Japan's corporate return on cost  exceeds  cost of capital.  The  IRRs  on 
value and  cost would become  equal if our  estimated  book  value  of entering  fIrms  would 
understate replacement cost  by  62  percent  for  all non-financial  (including  the  service  and 
regulated sectors), by 37 percent for keiretsu fInns, and by  56 percent for non-kereitsu fIrms 
(and for  real  cash flows,  59,  37,  and  53  percent,  respectively).  Comparing  with  FF,  the 
lowest "tolerance margin" (the 37 percent for keiretsu fIrms)  here is  even bigger than the US 
counterpart of 35 percent because the US  spread between the IRRs on cost and on value  is 
smaller. At any rate, it is unlikely that the underestimation of the cost of assets  would come 
anywhere near the levels needed to invalidate the conclusions. 
After this discussion of the measurement issues regarding the average IRRs, we  now 
turn to their evolution over time. 
4.4  The Evolution of the IRRs 
As  we  saw  in  the  previous  section,  the  terminal  value  is  the  second  most  important 
determinant in the estimates of IRRs. Thus, we want to  see the IRRs  on  value  and  cost  in 
JPY for different termination dates. To that end, we compute IRRs for termination year 1985 
using the data of 1974-85, and we obtain similar estimates for each of the years  1986 to  1995 
by  sequentially adding back more data years at the end. Figure  1.A depicts the evolution of 
estimates of both nominal  and real  IRRs  for  all  non-fmancial  firms  from  termination years 
1985 to 1995. 
The  IRRs  are  highest in  1987-88  and lowest  in  1990s,  reflecting  the  trend  of the 
Japanese stock prices. In real term, the plots  just shift down  in an  almost-parallel  fashion. 
The evolution of IRRs is predictably smooth because each estimate shares at least 90  percent 
17 of the data with the  adjacent years.  The spread between IRR on cost and value, whether 
nominal or real, remains positive, but slowly declines over time (Figure  1.C). Nevertheless, 
our conclusion that the fIrms  have been adding value is  not  qualitatively  sensitive  to  the 
termination date. The reason for this result is the initial market-to-book ratio, as discussed in 
Section 3.3. 
Figure 1.B compares keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms after adjusting for inflation. The 
general pattern is similar to that for all firms in Figure 1.A.  One interesting observation here, 
which also holds for the unreported nominal IRRs, is that early 90s seem to mark a watershed 
in the fate of keiretsu firms. Before the early 90s, the cost of capital for keiretsu firms  had 
always stayed comfortably below the cost of capital for non-keiretsu firms.  But in 1991, the 
IRR on value for keiretsu firms (5.86 percent) approaches the IRR on value for non-keiretsu 
firms (6.04 percent), and stays very close for two more years. As of 1994, lastly, the IRR on 
value (cost of  capital) for keiretsu firms exceed the IRR on value for non-keiretsu finns. 
While the non-keiretsu firms seem to  have dominated in terms of cost of capital only 
if we  include  the  most  recent  years  into  the  sample,  their  return  on  investment  has 
systematically been higher than that for  keiretsu firms  (Figure  I.B).  To  provide  a  clearer 
picture, Figure I.e plots the real value added, that is, the spread between the IRR on real cost 
and value,  for  both keiretsu and non keiretsu finns.  Unlike the hump-shaped  evolution of 
either the IRR on cost or on value in Figure 1.B, both keiretsu and non-keiretsu benefit-cost 
spreads have been shrinking as of 1985. However, the rate of decline of the two diverged in 
early 90s, with the keiretsu value added dropping markedly faster than the non-keiretsu one 
for subsequent years. The above results on the spread may suggest that the non-keiretsu finns 
were, on average (and especially in recent years) fmancially healthier than keiretsu ones, but 
also  that both weakened after  1990.  However, as  emphasized by  Merton  (1980)  and  FF 
(1997a) the  estimation of expected cost of capital (and  especially,  the  expected return  on 
equity) is notoriously inaccurate. Thus,  it is prudent  to  look also  at other evidence before 
making any firm inferences on Japan's corporate health. 
5.  Analysis of Corporate Earnings, Investment and Financial Decisions 
Managers are expected to make fInancial decisions so as to maximize the firm's value or, given 
the cash flows from projects and the business risk, minimize its cost of capital by  avoiding 
agency costs. The traditional view (see, e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap,  and Scharf  stein, 1991) is that 
18 the keiretsu frrms are less liquidity constrained. Specifrcally, their investment is less sensitive 
to  availability  of internal  funds  because  the  main-bank  relationship  reduces  information 
asymmetries (see Myers  and Majluf, 1984). As  a result,  keiretsu frrms  are  able  to  take on 
more debt and avoid agency costs (see Jensen and Meckling,  1976, for the agency theory). If 
this traditional view is correct, their cost of capital must be lower than that  of non-keiretsu 
frrms. The results of  the previous sections do not unambiguously confrrm this  co~ecture: we 
found that in all samples terminating between 1991 and 1995 the keiretsu cost of capital is, at 
best, little different from the non-keiretsu one.  Of course,  the  differences between the  two 
groups'  cost  of capital  may  primarily  reflect  business  risk  rather  than  agency  costs.  In 
addition, the above puzzle may be  due to estimation errors in the IRRs. A related puzzle is 
that also in terms of the value added keiretsu fIrms  seemed to  be in worse shape  relative  to 
non-keiretsu for the recent period. All this warrants further scrutiny.  In this section, we look 
at  the  capital structure,  investment,  and,  particularly,  financial  decisions  of the  Japanese 
fIrms,  to  see whether they  provide  evidence  that corroborates  the  preliminary conclusions 
from the IRRs. 
5.1  Capital Structure 
Table  6  describes aggregate  capital  structure  for  all non-fInancial  companies as  well  as  for 
keiretsu fIrms  and non-keiretsu fIrms  separately. We frrst look at the total sample, and then 
compare keiretsu to non-keiretsu fIrms. 
5.1.1.  All Non-financials: levels and dynamics 
In Table 6, Panel A, we present average data on capital structure across all years 1974-95. For 
the entire sample, 52.3 percent of total market capital of all fIrms in the sample is  common 
equity, 27.0 percent is the long-term debt, and 20.7 percent is  short-term debt. Note that,  at 
47.7 percent, the share of all debt in total value for Japan is much higher than the 31.5-percent 
fIgure that FF report over a comparable period (1974-96) for  all non-financial US  fIrms.  This 
difference  in  the  degree  of leverage  is  in  line  with  common  perceptions.  But  also  the 
composition of  debt-short versus long debt, and bank debt versus bonds--differs across the 
two countries. As a fraction of total fIrm value, long-term debt is about equally important in 
both countries (27.0 percent in Japan, 25.0 in the US); thus,  in terms of term to  maturity the 
differences are mainly found in short-term debt (20.7 percent of total value in Japan,  6.5  in 
the US).  Our Japanese data also provides information on the type  of lender. Japanese fIrms 
19 use more long-term bank loans than bonds: on average, the 27.0 percent long-term debt in the 
sample consists for  16.9 percent of long-term bank loans, 8.0 percent of straight bonds, and 
2.1 percent of  convertible bonds. 
The above figures are averages over the entire period. Over time, the capital structure 
has become more "American", in terms of the composition of debt as well  as  the  degree  of 
leverage  (see similar patterns  in Campbell and Hamao,  1994,  with less  recent  data).  First 
consider the structure of  debt. Over time, bonds have become more important (rising from 7.0 
percent in 1974-80 to  11.0 percent in 1991-95), and particularly so  convertible bonds (from 
1.5  percent to  3.2 percent). This reflects the effect of fmancial market deregulation in Japan 
since the mid-70s, which enabled firms to shift some of  their debt financing from banks to the 
capital markets. The decreased importance of bank debt shows up  in both short- and long-
term bank debts. A second area of  change is the decline in total leverage: over 1974-95, equity 
financing has become increasingly important.  The average share of equity in the total market 
value for all non-fmancial Japanese firms rose from 38.4 percent for 1974-80 to 57.6 percent 
for  1991-95.  The peak, 68.3  percent for  1986-90, is  obviously  due  to  the  equity-market 
bubble in that period. 
5.1.2.  Keiretsu versus non-keiretsu 
It  is generally believed that keiretsu firms are able to take on more debt because of their close 
relationships with main banks. This is borne out by the  comparison of Panels B (keiretsu) 
and C (non-keiretsu) in Table 6.  Panel B shows that, for 1974-95, the keiretsu equity, long-
term debt, and short-term debt amount to,  respectively, 50.5, 26.7, and 22.8 percent of total 
market value. In contrast, from Panel C, the corresponding numbers for non-keiretsu firms are 
58.6,20.5, and 20.9 percent oftotal market value. The keiretsu firms' heavier reliance on debt 
financing (49.5 percent) relative to non-keiretsu firms (41.5  percent)  also  holds in each and 
every subperiod, as shown in Table 6. We also see that most of  the difference comes from the 
more intensive use of  long-term debt financing by keiretsu firms.  All this confirms the role of 
long-standing relationships with the main bank. 
As non-keiretsu firms lack close relationship with main banks, one would expect them 
to rely more on the arm's-length financial markets than keiretsu firms do.  Thus, bonds should 
be more important in the non-keiretsu capital  structure.  However, Table  6,  Panel B  and C 
show that  the  non-keiretsu  firms  actually  use  less  straight  bonds  (4.2  percent)  than  the 
keiretsu firms do (6.9 percent). One explanation is  that  bonds are  debentures  and the main 
20 banks usually provide guarantees for bonds issued through them. Thus,  even when it comes 
to  bond issues,  relationships  with banks  still play  a  major  role.  Interestingly,  convertible 
bonds are not less important in non-keiretsu firms (2.4 percent) than in keiretsu firms  (2.2 
percent). This is probably due to the fact that non-keiretsu firms are smaller, more risky,  and 
higher-growth firms.lo  There is also  a discrepancy  between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms 
regarding  the  choice  between short- and long-term  debt  (26.7  percent  long-term  and  22.8 
percent short-term for keiretsu, versus 20.5 and 20.9 percent for non-keiretsu).  On  average, 
the small and growth-oriented non-keiretsu firms use far less long-term than short-term debt 
relative to the keiretsu firms. This is consistent with Titman and Wessels' (1988) fmdings for 
the US, where small and growth firms tend to use more short-term debt than long-term debt. 
5.1.3.  Capital Structure: a Summary 
We sum up as follows.  First, Japanese firms take on more debt than do  US  firms.  However, 
since the start of deregulation of the Japanese financial markets in mid-70s, we witness two 
major changes in the capital structure of  the Japanese firms. First, the role of equity financing 
and in Japan has increased considerably. Second, bonds and convertible bonds-that is, debt 
financing  from the market-have increased their weights  in  total  debt  (without,  however, 
overtaking bank loans). There are also interesting differences in debt financing  among the two 
groups of Japanese firms. Keiretsu firms, with their close relationships with main banks, are 
more highly leveraged than non-keiretsu firms, and especially so in terms of long-term bank 
debt and  straight bonds  (which are  likely to  be  issued  through,  and  guaranteed  by,  main 
banks). However, non-keiretsu firms rely on convertible bonds relatively more than keiretsu 
firms do. 
5.2.  Earnings, Investment, and Financial Decisions 
The changes in capital structure revealed by Table 6 may  be an optimal response to  changing 
cash in- and outflows caused, in turn, by fluctuating operating and investment conditions. For 
a better understanding of how and why  firms change their capital structures,  we  examine  in 
this section the components of  cash inflows and outflows. The cash constraint is as follows: 
10 Such films  have  a higher variance risk and  bigger infonnation asymmetries and hence  greater agency costs. 
Thus, these fInns have a more incentive to issue hybrid fmancial  instruments  such as  convertible bonds to  ease 
investors'  concerns  about  infonnation  asymmetries  and  agency  problems  (see  Mikkelson,  1980,  1981,  and 
Brennan and Schwartz, 1988). 
21 Yt + Dpt + dSt + dLTDt + dSTDt =  It + Divt + Intt .  (6) 
The aggregate annual inflows are cash earnings (earnings before interest but after taxes,  Yt> 
plus  depreciation,  Dpt),  net  issues  or  repurchases  of stocks  (dSU,  and  the  issues  or 
redemption  of long- and  short-term  debt  (dL  TDt  and  dSTDt).  The  outflows  are  gross 
investment (change in book capital from t-l to t, plus depreciation, IU,  dividends (Divt), and 
interest (Intt).  For most of this  section,  cash  flows  are  expressed  as  proportions  of the 
beginning-of-the year book capital of the fIrms.  However, in the  last subsection, where  we 
investigate  the  possible  impact of liquidity  constraints  of firms'  investment,  we  yearly 
investment as the scaling variable. 
5.2.1.  Statics of Cash In- and Outflows 
Panel A in Table 7 shows that, for 1974-95, annual gross investment (It) of all non-fmancials 
is  on average  12.22  percent of the  beginning-of-the-year  book  capital.  Annual  internally 
generated funds of  the Japanese non-fmancials-that is, cash earnings Xt = Yt + Dpt-average 
14.34 percent. Compared to the US firms'  13.l2 percent and 15.11  percent for investment 
and cash earnings in FF (1998) for 1951-96, internal funds  exceed investment outlays  by  a 
similar margin here (2.12 percent) as in the US (1.99 percent). However, relative to  the US 
firms, the Japanese firms payout far more: the low dividends (1.23 percent of initial value) 
are more than compensated by higher interest payments (5.62 percent). As the combined cash 
payout of  dividends and interest consume a big chunk of cash earnings, firms cannot fmance 
all of  their investments by retained cash earnings (RCE): 
RCEt  =  (Yt + DpU- (Divt + Intt) .  (7) 
From Table 7, annual retained cash earnings are on average 7.48 percent of total book capital 
(less than in the  US  case, 9.l2 percent).  Obviously,  the gap  relative to the  12.22  percent 
required for investments must be filled by outside financing--equity and debt issues, which 
together amount to 4.74 percent. Almost half of this is fresh long-term debt (2.43  percent), 
followed  by  short-term  debt  (1.45  percent)  and  new equity  (less  than  one  percent).  In 
contrast,  new  equity  takes  the  second  place  in  the  US  firms  (FF,  1998).  The  closer 
relationship with banks in Japan makes it relatively easy to  roll over short-term  loans, and 
hence short-term debt seems to have a quasi-permanent nature. The more recent period 1991-
22 95, however, marks a break in that tradition, as we see when we discuss the dynamics in the 
next section. 
Distinguishing between keiretsu and non-keiretsu, Panel B and C in Table 7 show that 
non-keiretsu firms  invest on average  more  than  keiretsu firms  (12.28  percent  per  year  of 
initial book capital for keiretsu, versus 11.47 percent for non-keiretsu firms).  Simultaneously, 
non-keiretsu firms also payout less: the total pay-out of dividends and interests takes 6.41 
percent of the beginning-of-the-year book capital, compared to  7.50 percent for the keiretsu 
firms. The difference in the non-investment outlays between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms 
is almost entirely due to a higher burden of  interest expenses by  keiretsu firms  (5.90 percent) 
relative  to  non-keiretsu firms  (5.08  percent).  This,  in  turn,  obviously  reflects  the  keiretsu 
firms' higher leverage, as already documented in Table 6. 
In  many  ways,  the  financing  is  similar  across  the  two  groups.  To  finance  cash 
outflows,  non-keiretsu firms draw marginally more from retained cash earnings,  RCEt,  (7.29 
versus  6.99),  although  these  non-keiretsu  firms  have  somewhat  lower  cash  earnings,  X(, 
(13.70 versus 14.04 percent). Neither group can fully  cover its  investments  (It)  by  internal 
fmancing  (RCEt);  the  shortfall  is  4.99  and  4.48  percent  for  non-keiretsu  and  keiretsu, 
respectively. In filling this gap, the pecking order of external funding  instruments  is  similar: 
long-term  debt  comes  first,  then  short-term  debt,  and  lastly  equity.  However,  there  are 
noticeable  differences  in  the  relative  importance  of the  components  of outside  financing. 
Specifically, new issues of the keiretsu long-term debt are  relatively  more  important  (2.25 
versus 1.94 percent), while the fresh equity is less important for keiretsu frrms  (0.82 versus 
1.3 7 percent). 
5.2.2.  Dynamics of Investment and Forms of Financing 
Table 7 also shows how these cash flows have evolved over time.  For the  first  half of our 
sample period,  1975-85, in  Panel A,  investments  in the  Japanese  firms  were  quite  stable 
(12.41  percent in 1975-80 and 12.33 percent in 1981-85). On the other hand, new long-term 
debt financing lost importance, dropping from  3.15 percent to  1.77  percent.  With negligible 
changes  in new issues  of equity  and  short-term  debt,  the  shortfall  was  mainly  filled  by 
increased retained cash earnings, which rose from  7.09 percent in 1975-80 to  8.26 percent in 
1981-85. 
23 During the second half of our sample,  1986-95  (roughly the  boom-and-bust years), 
there were  more pronounced and profound  changes.  During  the  bubble years  for  1986-90, 
investments  soared to  15.71  percent,  with  a sharp  increase  in long-term debt  (up  to  3.85 
percent) on the fmancing side. The reverse happened during the bust years for  1991-95: long-
term debt issues dropped to an all-time low of  0.81  percent, mirroring a severe contraction of 
corporate investment to 8.39 percent of book value. In the slump years, corporate cash flow 
(either side of  equation 6) deviates substantially from its  grand average: for  1991-95 the cash 
flow shrunk to 12.37 percent of  book capital, way below the grand average of19.07 percent. 
For a better perspective on the  relations between investments  and  financing  for  the 
past 22  years,  we follow FF  (1998) and compute the  correlation between annual  corporate 
investment,  It.  and each of the forms  of financing,  all  deflated  by  initial  book  value.  The 
correlation of  investment with the volume of  new equity issues (dSt)  is 0.35, which is almost 
twice the figure observed for the US firms (FF,  1998). FF explain the weak correlation in the 
US by the fact that new stocks are often used to finance mergers. As mergers do not change 
the aggregate capital stock and are only weakly related with other forms of investment, they 
obscure the relation between equity issues and regular investments. In view of the paucity of 
mergers  in  Japan,  the  evidence  here  is  consistent  with  FF's  explanation.  The  correlation 
between investment (It)  and other forms of financing is stronger: it amounts to  0.63  for cash 
earnings (RCEl)  or short-term debt (dSTDt), and to  an impressive 0.84 for  long-term debt 
(dLTDt).  Consistent with FF's US  findings,  long-term debt  seems to  be the  prime marginal 
fmancing vehicle of  corporate investment. 
Comparing  keiretsu  with  non-keiretsu,  the  difference  in  the  correlations  between 
investment and forms of financing  is  generally small.  If there is any  noticeable  difference,  it 
appears  in  the  link  between  new  issue  of equity  (dSl)  and  investments  (I),  where  the 
correlation is far stronger for non-keiretsu companies (0.51, versus 0.35  for keiretsu).  Thus, 
equity fmancing tends to playa more important role in accommodating year-by-year variation 
in investment in non-keiretsu firms  than in keiretsu firms.  The  difference between keiretsu 
and non-keiretsu regarding the pecking order offmancing becomes more pronounced when we 
directly express forms of fmance as percents of investments (instead of book capital), as we 
do in the last subsection (5.2.4). Before that, we address free cash flows and dividends. 
24 5.2.3.  Free Cash Flows and Dividend Policy 
Forms of financing also have to do with dividend policy.  One  source  of funds  for  dividend 
payments is free cash flows, FCFb  defined as 
(8a) 
=  Divt  - dSt - elL TDt - dSTDt .  (8b) 
While,  as  a stock  variable,  cash balances have  been rather high,  the  last  column  in 
Table 7 shows that the Japanese firms do not hoard free  cash flows.  To  the  contrary,  free 
cash flows of all non-financials are on average negative  (-3.51 percent of book capital, from 
Panel A). The free  cash flows  in themselves provide, however, ambiguous information about 
the state of corporate health. Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow  in the  same  way  as  (8), 
except that investment (It) is defmed normatively as including just the positive-NPV projects. 
He argues that positive free cash flows reflect a lack of investment opportunities and increase 
agency cost due to the conflict of management and  shareholders.  Thus,  if one  is  willing to 
assume that all  actual investments  were  optimal,  Japan's  negative  average  annual  free  cash 
indicates profitable  investment opportunities  and low agency  costs.  In the  same  vein,  the 
partial reversal of  this phenomenon towards the end of the period (when free case flows rose 
from -5.63 percent for 1986-90 to -1.67 percent for 1991-95) would then reflect a worsening 
investment environment.  Alternatively,  one  may  also  argue  that  the  Japanese  management 
was overinvesting during 1986-90, which, if true,  probably  is  more damaging  to  firms  than 
high agency costs.  This view would be consistent with the argument by  Kester  (1991)  that 
the hidden cost of the Japanese success would be the poor use of the free cash flow by the 
Japanese management. 
Given the negative free cash flows, any dividend payout must be covered by  outside 
financing.  The  correlation of annual  aggregate  dividends  (Divt)  and  annual  free  cash  flows 
(FCFt)  as percentages of  book capital of  all non-financials is -0.39. Thus,  dividend payout is 
not a "swing" variable set so  as to  minimize the firm's need for  external funds.  Rather, years 
with high net fmancing requirements (that is, unusually negative FCFs) also tend to  be years 
with  high dividends.  We  conclude  that  dividend payout has  its  own  momentum,  and  on 
average actually exacerbates rather than mitigates the need to  attract funds from  outside.  Of 
course, this can only happen if sufficient outside financing is available, as  (8b) shows.  On a 
25 closer  inspection,  dividend payout turns  out  to  co-vary  mostly  with  short-term  debt 
financing, and tends to drop when new stock is issued.  For all non-financials, the correlations 
between dividend paid out and, respectively, fresh short-term debt  (dSTDt),  long-term debt 
(dL TDt) and equity are 0.70, 0.43, and -0.34, respectively. Combining this with the evidence 
on investments, we see that short-term debt is more related to  dividends than to  investments, 
while the opposite is true for long-term debt. 
From Table 7, Panel Band C, we also see that,  as of 1981-85, the free  cash flows  for 
non-keiretsu firms  have  been somewhat  more  negative  than  for  keiretsu  companies.  This 
holds true also  for the grand average,  -3.65 versus -3.33 percent of total  book capital,  as 
would be  expected in view of the  difference  between  their  investments.  Recall  that  non-
keiretsu firms always invested more, relative to  book value, than keiretsu firms.  We also  see 
that the keiretsu firms are largely responsible for the phenomenon that dividends are financed 
by  (especially  short-term)  debt  and  decline  when  new  stock  is  issued.  Specifically,  for 
keiretsu firms the correlations with dividend payout are  stronger (0.81  for short-term debt, 
0.40 for long-term debt, and -0.37 for equity) than those for non-keiretsus firms (0.41, 0.36, 
and -0.01, respectively). 
We have noted that, to some extent, dividend payout has its own momentum. The fact 
that firms maintain a relatively stable dividend policy (Lintner,  1956) indicates that they  are 
reluctant to  cut dividends because the  market may take  it as  a bad  signalY  This  argument 
should be more powerful for firms that depend more on market financing  and especially on 
equity. Thus, keiretsu firms should have less fears in cutting their dividends because they  can 
better communicate with their main banks (see the argument by  Woolridge and Ghosh,  1985). 
Consistently  with  this,  Dewenter and Warther (1998)  do  find  that  non-keiretsu  firms  for 
1982-93 are more reluctant to  cut dividends than are keiretsu firms.  All this has implications 
for the average  level  of the payout ratio:  non-keiretsu firms  should prefer a low pay-out 
policy  since this reduces the risk of having to cut the  dividend.  In addition,  a low pay-out 
policy economizes on the costs of issuing new equity, which is an important source of funds 
for non-keiretsu firms. 
Indeed,  Table 8 shows  that  the  non-keiretsu dividends,  1.56  percent  of the  year's 
initial  aggregate  book value,  is  on  average  lower  than  the  keiretsus'  dividend  ratio  (1.69 
26 percent). This is also true in every sub-period.l2 If  we scale dividends by  earnings rather than 
by  initial book value, we get the same picture: the  non-keiretsu fIrms,  on average,  paid  out 
marginally less dividends (39 percent of  earnings) than the keiretsu fIrms did (41  percent).  We 
also  see  that the  non-keiretsu dividend payout tends  to  be more  stable  than the  keiretsu 
dividend payout. Interestingly, unlike  dividend  yields  (DivlPrice)  that  show a  downward 
trend  since  mid-70s,  the  dividend  pay-out  ratios  (DivlEarnings)  of Japanese  fIrms,  both 
keiretsu or non-keiretsu, tend to be mean-reverting. l3  Like  the  earlier fIndings  by  Dewenter 
and Warther (1998) for 194 Japanese fIrms, and Fama and Babiak (1968) and FF  (1997b) for 
US  fIrms,  our fIndings  is  another manifestation  of the  dividend  target  pay-out  model  by 
Lintner (1956). 
5.2.4.  Forms of Financing relative to Investment, and Liquidity Constraints 
The  evidence  that the Japanese  dividend pay-out  has  its  own  momentum  contradicts  the 
strict version of  Myers' (1984) pecking order model, which says fIrms resort to outside funds 
for investment only after exhausting internal funds.  However, dividends also act as signaling 
devices that mitigate information asymmetries and hence lower the costs  of outside fInancing. 
Taking into account this argument in favor of a stable dividend policy, a weaker form of the 
pecking  order model can be  advanced,  saying  that  returned  earnings  should  be  the  major 
source of  funds for investment. 
If  the fIrm faces severe agency costs, the pecking order model implies that investment 
should be highly sensitive to cash flow,  after controlling for future investment opportunities 
(see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988, and Hoshi, Kashyap,  ans Scharf  stein, 1991); 
Contradicting this conjecture, however, Kaplan and Zingales  (1997)  and  Cleary  (1998)  fmd 
that fIrms  that  are  classifIed  on exogenous  grounds  as  less  liquidity-constrained,  have  the 
highest investment-cashflow sensitivity. Thus, it seems there is no agreed method of detecting 
11  See e.g., Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985),  among others for the dividend signaling model,  and 
Kumar (1988) for the "coarse signaling" theory, which explains the rationale of  a stable dividend polity. 
12  As percentages of  total book capital (panels B and C in Table 7),  the  average keiretsu dividends are actually 
smaller than the average non-keiretsu dividends. However, to investors the percentages relative to market value 
are the more relevant ones. It is well known that the Japanese dividend yield is  low  by international standards, 
and the  all-firm average of dividend yield is  merely 1.74  percent. The fact that this  is  somewhat higher than 
either  the  keiretsu  or  non-keiretsu  figures  is  explained  by  the  existence  of a  third,  relatively  high-yield 
subsample, the utilities and communication sectors. 
13  The  fact  that  payout ratios  in  Table  9  increase  markedly  from  1986-90  to  1991-95  across  board  is  in 
consistent to the conclusion by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) that firms  in  financial  distress are reluctant to 
cut their dividends. We know that the Japanese fInns at large were suffering in 1990s. 
27 whether fIrms with higher agency costs and greater infonnation asymmetry do face  a higher 
cost of  capital. 
In subsection 5.2.2, we have used the correlation of the investment-to-value and each 
of the  sources  of fInancing  to  describe  the  dynamic  relation  of investment  and  financial 
decisions. However, with only a small sample size  (22  yearly  observations),  the estimated 
correlations are not very reliable.  In this  section, we have a closer look at the investment-
financing relation by expressing the sources of financing  as  percentages of total  investment 
instead of  book capital. For this purpose, the convenient version of writing the flow-of-funds 
equation is 
(9) 
We fIrst  study  the components of (9)  for the  total-sample  level,  once  in terms  of grand 
averages and then dynamically. 
Panel A  of Table 9  shows that  annual retained cash earnings  (RCEt)  average 66.27 
percent of total  investment in all non-financial fIrms.  Thus,  internal financing  is the  main 
source of funds  for investment.  Annual net cash inflow from  long-term debt takes up,  on 
average, 16.50 percent of investment, annual new short-tenn debt placements 10.66 percent, 
and fresh equity only accounts to 6.56 percent. In terms of the share in (annual) incremental 
investment, this is, on balance, in line with Myers' (1984) pecking order model. 
While the pecking order story appears to hold on average, the results in Table 9,  Panel 
A, also show also that the picture has changed over time, especially during the boom-and-bust 
years 1986-95. In the recession period, 1991-95, retained cash earnings (RCEt) average 77.93 
percent of  investment, new issues oflong- and short-tenn debt altogether provide a mere 6.84 
percent,  while new issues of equity  soar  to  15.23  percent.  The  drop  of debt's  share  of 
financing  suggests  that  Japanese  finns  can  no  longer  borrow  as  easily  as  before.  (The 
alternative explanation, namely that finns simply do not need to borrow as much as before, is 
contradicted by their higher reliance on costly equity.) While banks apparently  still provide 
long-term loans, the falling role of debt is especially pronounced in new issues of bonds and 
short-term debt. New issues of straight  bonds  in this  period  have  even become  negative, 
averaging -1.49 percent of  investment. 
The  next  issue  is  whether  keiretsu  and  non-keiretsu  firms  behave  differently. 
Qualitatively, the grand averages  for  1974-95 per subgroup shows that  keiretsu  and  non-
28 keiretsu fIrms have been rather similar regarding the relation between investment and fonns of 
fInancing. Panel B and C in Table 9 show that, on average, both follow the textbook pecking 
order: retained earnings for keiretsu (non-keiretsu) fIrms  stand  for  69.51  (67.12) percent  of 
investment, debt for 23.91  (22.58)  percent,  and equity  for  6.58  (l0.30) percent.  The  main 
difference has to do with the maturity of debt fInancing,  with the keiretsu fInns relying more 
on long-term debt for (14.89 percent, against 9.56 for non-keiretsu fInns) and less on short-
term debt for  (9.02 percent as  opposed to  13.02). The relative strength of keiretsu fInns  in 
long-term debt fmancing is obviously due to their close ties with main banks. 
In  a  dynamic  perspective,  however,  the  contrast  of keiretsu  with  non-keiretsu 
becomes  more  obvious.  Panel B and C in Table  9 show that,  in  1991-95, keiretsu  annual 
retained cash earnings soar to 88.82 percent of investment-way above non-keiretsus' 73.73 
percent,  and  quite  different  from  the  1986-90  period  where  the  two  groups  had  similar 
percentages (53.71  and 52.48). Since profItability did not exactly peak and dividends did not 
drop  that  much either, the rising RCEII  ratio means that investments  were dropping  even 
faster than retained cash earnings, and more so in the keiretsu fInns.  Based on the infonnation 
on the high share of retained cash earnings in investment alone,  it  is  not clear whether this 
reflects a more pronounced lack of  profItable projects within the keiretsu groups, or instead a 
reversal of an earlier possible over-investment mistake. The latter scenario,  compounded by 
the  deteriorating  state  of the  Japanese  banking  sector,  would  indicate  tighter  corporate 
liquidity-constraints that force fIrms  (and particularly keiretsu ones) to  forego positive NPV 
projects-a classic debt overhang or under-investment problem. 14, 15 
For  the  credit-crunch  period  1991-95,  keiretsu  and  non-keiretsu  fIrms  experience 
interestingly different ways of  suffering, as shown in Panel Band C in Table 9. Keiretsu fInns 
reduced short-term debt (dSTD = -11.02 percent of investment),  and their new long-tenn 
debt capital comes almost entirely from banks (4.21  percent of investment). By contrast, new 
issues  of  short-term  debt  by  non-keiretsu  fInns  remained  high,  at  14.60  percent  of 
14 Debt fmancing is believed in the agency theory to be able to  prevent management from  over-investment, see, 
e.g.,  Jensen  (1986),  Stulz  (1990),  and  Hart  and Moore  (1995).  However,  from  the  information  asymmetry 
(adverse selection) theory, debt financing demonstrates a big disadvantage:  debt  overhang  (see  Myers,  1977), 
which is pronounced in difficult times. 
15  As  mentioned,  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and  Scharf  stein  (1991)  fmd,  however,  keiretsu  fIrms  used  to  be  less 
liquidity-constrained than non-keiretsu fIrms, but their data cover 1965-85, long  before the  1990s,  a period that 
was especially dismal to the main-bank centered keiretsu members. If  we  are  willing  to  accept that  a  higher 
reliance  on  retained  cash  earnings  means  more  liquidity  constraints,  ceteris paribus,  we  can  find  some  of 
29 investment, and on  balance  these  finns  retire  long-term  debt  (dLTD  = -4.55  percent  of 
investment,  mainly  because  of net  withdrawals  of straight  bonds  to  the  tune  of -10.42 
percent of investment). 
This infonnation on the relation of investment and outside financing corroborates the 
view that keiretsu finns faced more stringent liquidity constraints.  Indeed,  the  international 
evidence  shows  that  if finns  face  high  cost  of debt  financing  and  hence  are  liquidity 
constrained, they  do  not issue short-tenn debt.  Specifically,  Guedes  and  Opler  (1996)  find 
that the US firms with good credit ratings issue debt at both the  short-end  and  long-end  of 
maturity  while  firms  with  speculative  grade  credit  ratings  borrow  in  the  middle  of the 
maturity spectrum. In this regard, keiretsu finns seem much more liquidity constrained in the 
1991-95  period.  To  explain the  non-keiretsu firms'  massive  retreat  from  the  straight-bond 
market in favor of  more short-tenn debt, we can invoke an infonnation-asymmetry argument 
(see Barclay and Smith 1995). Specifically, for the relatively small-sized and growth-oriented 
non-keiretsu finns,  asymmetry  in infonnation between finns  and  bond  investors  becomes 
severe in bad market conditions. Thus, non-keiretsu firms have more incentives to  approach 
banks for funding; and banks, having become more careful in their credit evaluations, are more 
likely to grant loans to the less-afflicted non-keiretsu finns than to keiretsu ones. 
5.2.5.  Cash Balances 
As  mentioned in the introduction, in the above we have treated all  cash holdings  as  part  of 
working capital,  even though part  of them represents  compensatory  balances  rather freely 
chosen assets.  When  we  split  up  investments  into  changes  in  cash  and  non-cash  assets 
(results available on request), we observe no major changes. As  expected, changes in the cash 
position are positively correlated with stock and loan issues as well as with dividends (which 
are financed by  issues of equity or debt,  as we have seen), but the correlations of non-cash 
investments are quite similar to the ones for total investment. 
Over time, there is one noticeable change towards the end of  the period.  Specifically, a 
nontrivial part of the drop  in investments in the 90s can be traced to reduced cash balances, 
which go down by  1.35% of total book value for all finns.  There is  little  difference,  in this 
respect,  between  keiretsu  versus  non-keiretsu.  The  main  conclusions,  however,  remain 
evidence in  Table 9 to  support their fmdings.  For  1975-80, the keiretsu retained cash earnings average  66.07 
percent of  investment while the non-keiretsu retained cash earnings average higher 72.30 percent. 
30 unaffected.  Non-cash investment,  still is markedly lower in  the  90s,  especially in keiretsu 
firms.  Nor does the stock  adjustment in the  cash balances  improve  the  free  cash flows:  at 
-3.02% of  book value in the 90s (-2.69% keiretsu, -3.67% non-keiretsu), the free cash flows 
remain negative, and more so for non-keiretsu firms. When looking at the sources of financing 
of  non-cash investment, the reliance on internal sources (redefined as retained earnings minus 
changes in cash balances) in the 90s becomes more marked. But this  does of course not affect 
our findings that all firms  issued more  stock and  reduced  their debt,  and that non-keiretsu 
firms  continued to  borrow short-term. Thus, the  patterns  observed in  total  investment and 
free cash flows are robust to our treatment of all cash balances 
5.2.6.  Investment, Pay Out, and Financing Decisions: a Summary 
To sum up, when we add to the Myers' (1984) pecking order model a target dividend policy, 
Japan's corporate fmancing conforms to the model: retained cash earnings represent the major 
source of funds  for  investment by  Japanese  non-financial firms.  New issues  of debt  come 
second in the fmancing of  investment, with especially long-term debt issues that closely track 
the  variations  in  investment.  Keiretsu  and  non-keiretsu  firms  exhibit  marked  differences 
regarding their financial decisions. In their outside financing for investment, keiretsu firms rely 
more on long-term debt while non-keiretsu firms,  which also invest more,  tend to  use more 
equity and short-term debt. Changes in dividends of  keiretsu firms are very strongly related to 
new issues of short-term debt, while the relation between non-keiretsu dividends and forms  of 
financing  is  weaker.  Non-keiretsu finns  have  a  marginally  lower  dividend  yield,  possibly 
explained by a desire for stable dividends andlor a desire to minimize costly equity issues. 
More recently, however, keiretsu firms have acted somewhat out of character in that 
they  seem to  have  become  more  liquidity  constrained.  Many  of them may  be  in  financial 
distress,  as  they  avoid  issuing-and even extensively retire-short-term debt,  often a sign 
that not all is well. Non-keiretsu firms have suffered too, but less so.  True, they  have become 
largely cut off from the straight-bond market, but they  are  still  able  to  approach  banks  for 
substantial  amounts  of new short-term  debt,  a  sign  that  these  firms  are  in  relative  good 
shape.16  This is in line with the finding of Anderson and Makhija (1999)  that  the  Japanese 
firms  with growth opportunities  took  more bank debts  in  1990.  Still,  corporate  and  bank 
31 behavior in 1990-95 was, as we have shown, rather different from  the  preceding  period,  so 
that general inferences about the presence or absence of hold-up behavior on behalf of banks 
remairI tentative. 
Although, by the standard pecking-order theory, equity is rated as a high-cost source 
offunds, in  1991-95 common stock suddenly becomes the second major source of funds  for 
investment in Japanese firms, especially in keiretsu. According to the model of project delay 
by  Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), new equity issues in Japan  should have  decreased at 
times of  economic contraction. Thus, the heavier reliance on expensive equity suggests that, in 
recent years, Japanese firms have had a hard time obtaining debt fmancing, which resulted in a 
rise of  their cost of  capital.  17  Since our evidence shows that the keiretsu firms had more new 
equity shares in the incremental investment relative to non-keiretsu firms, the keiretsu firms 
must  face  more  difficulty  in debt  financing  and  hence  more  liquidity  constrained.  This 
confirms the results on IRRs in the previous section. 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we first estimate the IRRs on value and cost for the Japanese non-financials for 
1974-95. The real return on value, or cost of capital, is 4.95  percent and the  real  return  on 
cost,  or return on corporate  investment,  is  7.94  percent.  Thus,  Japanese  firms  have,  on 
average, added value. These numbers are similar to the fmdings by FF  (1998) for the US non-
fmancials  for  a  similar  period.  When  translated  into  (real)  USD,  the  Japanese  estimates 
become larger, 7.63 and 10.86 percent, than the US  counterparts. It seems that the  popular 
notion of  a low cost of  capital in Japan is confounded by a numeraire effect. 
The main issue of the  paper  is,  however,  a  comparison  between  the  (main-bank-
affiliated) keiretsu firms and non-keiretsu firms.  We show that the reciprocal holding among 
the Japanese business firms declines steadily over time, indicating that the intemal-disciplirIe-
enhancing role by the main-bank system has been dimirIishing.  Still, keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
'6  Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) argue that finns that anticipate improvement in  credit  ratings  in  the 
future  have  greater  incentive  to  borrow  short-term.  James  (1987)  shows  that  investors  tend  to  take  finns' 
increase in (short-term) bank debt as a favorable signal. 
17 In effect, Kang and Stulz (1996) find  in their Japanese sample for  1985-91  that,  while prior to 
1990 there were significantly positive abnormal returns after the equity  issue  announcements,  the 
Japanese  market  appears  to  be  more  "American"  by  reacting  negatively  to  equity  issue  as  of 
1990. 
32 remain remarkably distinguishable in many ways. On balance, the keiretsu member fIrms take 
on  more  long-term debt while the non-keiretsu  flnns  rely  on more  equity  and  convertible 
bonds.  The non-keiretsu fIrms  are  relatively  small-sized and growth-oriented, and  seem  to 
maintain a relatively stable dividend policy with lower dividend yield. In contrast, the relation 
between  dividend  payment  and  new  issue  of short-term  debt  is  particularly  strong  for 
keiretsu fIrms. 
The corporate sector in Japan has undergone painful changes in 1990s, with  a credit 
crunch and a dramatic decrease in investment. As  a result,  we  see changes  in the  corporate 
cost of  capital and the return on corporate investment. Until the early 90s, the  cost-of-capital 
gap between keiretsu fIrms  and non-keiretsu fIrms  used to  be  comfortably in favor  of the 
main-bank centered keiretsu fIrms.  This  conforms with the  traditional view.  However,  this 
fInancial  advantage of the  keiretsu fIrms  was reversed afterwards.  Our  examination  of the 
dynamics of corporate earnings, investment and the ways  of fInancing helps pin down  how 
the main-bank system went wrong. The keiretsu fIrms  were clearly in a worse fInancial  state 
during the period 1991-95. Retained earnings fell,  and investment dropped  even faster;  new 
issues of  equity soared and seem to be used to payoff short-term debt.  Also the non-keiretsu 
fIrms,  in this  last period,  abandon Myers'  (1984)  pecking  order  of external  fInancing  by 
issuing more equity relative to investment, but unlike keiretsu fIrms they continued to  be able 
to place considerable amounts of short-term debt.  Maybe the Japanese fIrms,  and especially 
keiretsu ones, were short of positive-NPV projects; but, if so,  why  would they  change  the 
pecking order of fInancing  with a substantial  increase  in new issues of costly  equity?  The 
more likely explanation is that past over-investments and a debt overhang resulted in liquidity 
constraints. In this regard, we show that keiretsu fIrms tended to  have greater problems than 
non-keiretsu fIrms  for  1991-95. These results from the analysis of investment and  fInancing 
decisions tie in  with the IRR estimates:  the  cost-of-capital  gap  between keiretsu and non-
keiretsu closed in the early 90s, and  the  keiretsu value  added  has  dropped  markedly  faster 
than the non-keiretsu one in subsequent years. 
An in-depth discussion of the failure of the main-bank system as of 1990 is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, several possibilities can be thought of, or have already 
been suggested in literature. One is that, before early-90s, banks as well as management were 
overly  optimistic  about the  returns  on  investment.  Given the  close  relationships  between 
bank and client, and the bubble economy, this  explanation has  some  credibility.  If true,  the 
keiretsus'  advantage  of lower agency  cost must have  been more  than offset  by  this  over-
33 investment mistake, which in  turn suggests  that,  after all,  banks/shareholders did  not  do  a 
very  good job in  monitoring.  Possibly,  the  monitoring  effectiveness  of the  main  banks 
deteriorated in the changing environment of  fmancial deregulation.Another possible reason for 
the reversal of  the keiretsu's cost of  capital advantage may have been that main banks exploit 
their information monopolies on client firms and charge their captive client firms a higher cost 
of  capital (Sharpe, 1990, and Rajan, 1992). Recall that existing empirical work is inconclusive. 
There  is  supporting  empirical evidence by  Houston  and  James (1996)  and  Weinstein  and 
Yafeh (1998), which goes back to the glory times of the Japanese corporations. In  contrast, 
Anderson  and  Makhija  (1999)  conclude  that  Japanese  bank  frnancing  does  not  impose 
meaningful hold-up costs  on firms  that  face  high  agency  costs  of arms-length  debt.  One 
problem with the latter evidence-that erstwhile constrained firms continued to take up  more 
bank debt after their access to the bond market was enhanced-is that it bears only on 1990, 
the first year after the deregulation of the  bond market. While we do not claim that our own 
evidence  is  conclusive,  at  least  it  bears  on  a  longer  post-liberalization  period.  What  we 
observe  is  a continuation of what Anderson and  Makhija (1999)  already  noted  for  1990. 
Specifically, we fmd  that  non-keiretsu firms  were  able  to  increase  substantially  their bank 
debt as of  the early 90s, even though these firms faced less legal constraints in issuing bonds 
than before, and even though the borrowers were small and growth-oriented and the economy 
was in a bad recession---circurnstances that should increase the cost of market financing and 
facilitate hold-up behavior on behalf of  banks. True, this evidence bears on non-keiretsu firms. 
But the recent reduction of bank borrowing by  keiretsu firms  likewise  suggests that banks 
have  been unable,  or possibly  even unwilling,  to  continue playing  their  role  of privileged 
lenders to firms within the group. 
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38 Table 1:  Sample Descriptions 
The  table  describes the  sample  in tenns of the  average  of annual  number of fInns,  cross-
holding, book and market capital. The  sample is based on PACAP's fIscal year-end data on 
the Japanese domestic non-fmancial fInns (all Japanese Industry Code except 0501-0513  for 
fInancials)  listed in the First and the Second Sections. We choose fInns with annual data on 
market and book value of capital for at least two  consecutive years.  Keiretsu fInns are close 
members (classified as 2-, 3-, or 4-star) of the Six Major Japanese Industrial  Groups.  Non-
keiretsu fInns are either the unaffiliated fInns or the weak members (I-star) of the  Groups, 
excluding Utilities (Code 0801) and Communications (0705). "Firms"  refers to  the number of 
finns in the sample at the end of each fIscal  year.  Book capital is the total end-of-year book 
value  of long-tenn  debt  (PACAP's  data  items  BAL14  and  BALI5),  short-tenn  debt 
(BALlI), and equity for  fInns  appearing  in the  corresponding fiscal  year.  Book equity  is 
total assets (BAL9) minus total liabilities (BALl 7).  Market capital is  the  total  end-of-year 
book value of short- and  long-tenn debts  plus  the  market value  of equity  [(MKTV AL  or 
share  price  (MKT3)  times  shares  outstanding  (MKT5)]  at  the  end  of March,  regardless 
whether fInns have a fIscal year end in March.  Data on the number of shares owned by the 
non-fInancial fIrms (JAF78) and the total number shares owned (JAF81)  in each fInn enables 
us  to  obtain  two  kinds  of  cross-holding  adjustment  factors:  K= 
(JAF78*MKT3)/(JAF81 *MKT3)  and H=K * [Total Market Equity/total Market  Capital]. 
To purge the inflating effect of  cross-holdings, the fIgures for market equity, market and book 
capital we use are defIned as market equity times (l-K), market capital times (l-H), and book 
capital times (I-H) in trillions of  JPY. 
Year  Firms  Cross-Holding  Book Capital  Market Capital 
All  keireaI  K  H  All  keiret!U  All  keiret!l1l 
(%)  (%)  (%)  (in triL)  (%)  (in triL)  (%) 
1974-79  1168  41.45  21.46  8.73  68.25  58.64  93.72  58.01 
1980-85  1296  39.52  21.16  11.36  104.93  55.83  165.30  55.82 
1986-90  1415  37.35  20.52  14.69  167.09  52.14  383.68  49.09 
1991-95  1512  36.13  16.63  9.89  236.70  50.91  373.56  48.81 
1974-95  1337  38.78  20.07  11.07  139.00  54.64  242.74  53.30 
39 Table 2: Distribution of keiretsu Members in Industries 
The table  shows  how keiretsu members  are  spread  in various  industries  in terms  of the 
average of  the annual number offirms, book capital and market capital (see definition in Table 
1).  We decompose the Japanese non-financial sector into  11  industries:  Construction  (Code 
201),  Manufacturing  (301-315),  which  is  further  divided  into  Food&tex&pap  (301-303), 
Chem&petr&rub  (307-310),  and  Machine&equip  (311-315),  Wholesale&retail  (401-402), 
Real  estate  (601),  Service  (901),  Ag&ut&trans&com  (101-103&701-705&801)  with  and 
without NTT. 
Industry  Firms  Book Capital  Market Capital 
All  Keiretsu  All  Keiretsu  All  Keiretsu 
(%)  (in trilions)  (%)  (in trillions)  (%) 
Construction  113  21.37  8.57  42.18  13.99  42.84 
Manufacturing  923  44.48  71.01  65.25  130.34  64.71 
Food&tex&JDp  166  44.00  9.48  61.61  17.17  63.30 
Chem&petr&rub  174  54.12  13.40  66.52  25.81  65.84 
G lass&steel&metal  154  54.98  14.73  68.60  25.16  68.33 
Machine&equip  429  36.97  33.40  64.49  62.20  63.23 
Wholesale&retail  133  29.19  21.66  63.13  30.76  57.26 
Real estate  19  30.75  3.94  61.20  6.38  66.69 
Service  38  11.19  1.29  16.38  3.18  16.55 
Ag&ut&trans&com wI  111  31.64  32.54  29.46  58.10  26.92 
WithoutNTT  110  31.76  29.49  31.52  47.96  29.92 
40 Table 3: Rates of Return on Value and Cost for 1974-95 
Panel A of  the table shows the IRRs on value and cost, defined in equations (I) and (2), for  all 
non-fmancial firms, keiretsu finns, and non-keiretsu finns over 1974-95. Keiretsu represents 
close members of the Six  Major Industry  Groups.  Non-keiretsu includes  either unaffiliated 
finns or weak members of the Groups,  excluding Utilities (Code 0801) and Communications 
(0705). The IRR on value estimates the return on investments of finns  that  are  acquired  at 
market value when they enter the sample, and sold at market value, either when they leave the 
sample or when we liquidate the sample in 1995. The IRR on cost assumes corporate assets 
are  acquired  at  book,  rather than  market  value.  Annual  nominal  cash  flows  in  USD  are 
converted from the original JPY cash flows using the USD/JPY rate in each end-March (from 
PACAP).  We compute real IRRs by  using  annual nominal cash flows  in JPY  (or  in USD) 
divided by the Japanese (or US) Consumer Price Index in March (from PACAP and CRSP). 
Panel B shows  simple  and  compound returns  on value for  all non-financials,  keiretsu,  and 
non-keiretsu firms in Panel A. Note that all these finns in the sample happen to have market 
value data at the beginning and end of a given year after entry  and  before  exit.  The  simple 
return for a year is Rt=[(XcI0+(VcVt-\)]Nt-J, where  V's are  the  aggregate  market values  of 
finns that have data at both the beginning and end of  year t and Xt-It is their aggregate net cash 











PanelA: IRRs on Value and Cost (in percent) 
IRRon Value  IRRon Cost  IRRon Value  IRRonCost 
inJPY  inJPY  inUSD  in USD 
Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 
8.01  4.95  11.34  7.94  13.24  7.63  16.89  10.86 
9.07  5.71  11.26  7.73  14.56  8.61  16.86  10.72 
8.61  5.56  11.74  8.42  13.96  8.33  17.29  11.34 
Panel B: Simple and Compound Returns (in percent) 
Simple Average  Geometric Mean 
In JPY  InUSD  InJPY  In USD 
Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 
8.96  5.86  15.87  10.20  8.51  5.38  13.90  8.17 
(2.20)  (2.27)  (4.98)  (4.94) 
9.44  6.34  16.30  10.61  8.97  5.83  14.38  8.62 
(2.27)  (2.37)  (4.89)  (4.86) 
9.75  6.62  16.68  10.99  9.14  5.99  14.56  8.79 
(2.56)  (2.60)  (5.18)  (5.13) 
41 Table 4: Components of Cash Flows in 1995 JPY 
The sample is based on PACAP's fiscal year-end data on the Japanese domestic non-financial 
firms (all Japanese Industry Code except 0501-0513) listed in the First and Second Sections. 
Keiretsu  represents  close  members  of the  Six  Major  Japanese  Industrial  Groups.  Non-
keiretsu firms  include  either  the  unaffiliated  firms  or  the  weak  members  of the  Groups, 
excluding Utilities (Code 0801) and Communications (0705). Firms stand for the  number of 
firms  at  the  beginning  of the  year.  Cash earnings,  Xt=Yt+Dpb  where  Yt is  the  sum of net 
income [(PACAP's data item INC9) and interest expense (JAF67)], and Dpt is depreciation 
expense (JAF74). Investment, Ib is the change in book capital from t-l to t,  plus depreciation. 
Thus, Xt-It is annual net cash flow from  operations.  A firm's cash flow  is  included in  the 
aggregate cash flow beginning in the year after the firm enters and through the year it leaves 
the sample. FBCt is the cost of  new firms bought at book value of capital (Cost) in t.  FBVt is 
the cost of firms bought at the market value of capital (Value) in year t (see Table 1 for the 
definition of  book and market values of capital.) FSt is the market value capital of firms  sold 
when they  leave the sample or termil"1ate  in 1995.  The total  net cash flow  for  year t,  Net 
FloW=(XcIt)+(FScFBCt) when the  new firms  are bought at cost.  Net Flow =  (XcIt)+(FSt-
FBVt) when the new firms are bought at value. Panel A,  B, and C show the components  of 
the aggregate cash flows for all non-financials, keiretsu, and non-keiretsu firms, respectively. 
New Firms  New Firms 
at Book Value  at Market Value 
Year  Firms  NetFiow  FBC  Net Flow  FBV  FS  X-I  X  I  Dp  I-Dp 
Panel A: All non-financials 
1974  0  -89.56  89.56  -116.99  116.99  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1975  868  -18.54  17.05  -27.41  25.93  0.00  -1.48  13.65  15.13  4.43  10.70 
1976  1210  4.16  0.16  3.95  0.37  0.00  4.32  16.24  11.92  5.12  6.80 
1977  1218  5.87  0.25  5.67  0.44  0.00  6.12  15.47  9.36  5.07  4.29 
1978  1228  6.94  0.22  6.72  0.43  0.00  7.16  15.25  8.09  5.35  2.74 
1979  1237  2.75  0.23  2.52  0.46  0.00  2.98  16.13  13.15  5.50  7.65 
1980  1248  4.56  0.25  4.33  0.48  0.00  4.81  19.12  14.30  5.88  8.42 
1981  1256  0.77  0.30  0.61  0.45  0.00  1.06  18.77  17.71  6.51  11.20 
1982  1272  3.20  0.62  2.36  1.46  0.00  3.82  18.82  15.00  6.61  8.39 
1983  1288  7.78  0.28  6.84  1.22  0.00  8.06  19.15  11.09  7.09  3.99 
1984  1304  5.19  0.29  4.56  0.92  0.00  5.48  20.31  14.83  7.67  7.16 
1985  1321  5.48  0.66  4.46  1.69  0.00  6.15  20.43  14.28  8.19  6.10 
1986  1332  -6.61  8.91  -48.89  51.20  0.00  2.30  19.05  16.74  8.48  8.26 
1987  1328  -0.87  0.88  -2.79  2.80  0.00  0.01  22.17  22.17  10.41  11.76 
1988  1388  -6.07  1.21  -7.50  2.64  0.00  -4.87  24.24  29.11  10.87  18.24 
1989  1435  -9.70  0.95  -11.63  2.89  0.75  -9.50  26.11  35.61  11.12  24.49 
1990  1457  1.44  1.02  -0.35  2.80  1.13  1.32  28.49  27.17  11.68  15.49 
1991  1468  -4.37  0.80  -5.81  2.23  0.56  -4.14  27.92  32.06  12.40  19.66 
1992  1483  5.19  1.13  4.56  1.76  2.61  3.71  16.42  12.71  4.54  8.17 
1993  1500  0.30  3.40  -6.58  10.28  0.61  3.09  21.71  18.62  12.19  6.43 
1994  1513  1.28  2.14  0.51  2.91  0.08  3.34  22.61  19.27  12.87  6.40 
1995  1534  423.07  0.00  423.07  0.00  411.30  11.76  23.23  11.46  13.00  -1.54 
42 Table 4 Continued 
New Firms  New Firms 
at Book Value  at Market Value 
Year  Firms  Net Flow  FBC  Net Flow  FBV  FS  X-I  X  I  Dp  I-Dp 
Panel B: Keiretsu Firms 
1974  0  -53.88  53.88  -70.75  70.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1975  382  -10.36  9.31  -15.53  14.49  0.00  -1.04  8.25  9.29  2.52  6.78 
1976  502  2.89  0.01  2.83  0.07  0.00  2.90  9.44  6.54  2.80  3.74 
1977  503  4.23  0.01  4.22  0.02  0.00  4.24  8.84  4.59  2.73  1.86 
1978  504  4.85  0.03  4.84  0.04  0.00  4.88  8.53  3.65  2.83  0.82 
1979  505  2.91  0.00  2.91  0.00  0.00  2.91  9.32  6.40  2.94  3.47 
1980  505  3.02  0.18  2.94  0.26  0.00  3.20  10.81  7.61  3.12  4.49 
1981  507  1.12  0.05  1.09  0.08  0.00  1.17  10.57  9.40  3.47  5.92 
1982  510  2.32  0.03  2.24  0.12  0.00  2.35  10.55  8.19  3.43  4.76 
1983  512  4.58  0.07  4.42  0.23  0.00  4.65  10.66  6.02  3.73  2.29 
1984  515  3.07  0.08  2.84  0.31  0.00  3.15  11.41  8.26  4.13  4.13 
1985  519  3.94  0.05  3.82  0.17  0.00  3.99  11.22  7.23  4.39  2.84 
1986  522  0.17  0.06  0.07  0.16  0.00  0.23  10.36  10.12  4.59  5.53 
1987  524  0.67  0.21  0.26  0.62  0.00  0.88  10.82  9.94  4.78  5.16 
1988  530  -2.59  0.64  -3.47  1.53  0.00  -1.95  12.04  13.99  4.99  9.00 
1989  536  -5.58  0.27  -6.12  0.81  0.04  -5.35  13.29  18.64  5.14  13.49 
1990  542  -0.45  0.15  -0.74  0.44  0.12  -0.42  14.76  15.17  5.48  9.69 
1991  545  -0.96  0.01  -0.99  0.03  0.56  -1.52  14.37  15.89  5.91  9.98 
1992  546  2.79  0.08  2.73  0.14  0.76  2.11  8.83  6.72  2.72  4.00 
1993  549  4.48  0.22  4.25  0.45  0.46  4.25  10.26  6.01  5.52  0.49 
1994  554  0.89  0.19  0.83  0.25  0.05  1.03  10.55  9.52  5.74  3.78 
1995  558  207.25  0.00  207.25  0.00  200.56  6.69  10.75  4.06  5.63  -1.56 
Panel C: Non-keiret!>1l Firms 
1974  0  -26.52  26.52  -35.74  35.74  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1975  473  -7.60  7.68  -11.29  11.37  0.00  0.08  4.11  4.03  1.39  2.64 
1976  698  1.72  0.15  1.58  0.30  0.00  1.88  5.29  3.41  1.66  1.75 
1977  703  1.79  0.23  1.60  0.42  0.00  2.02  4.94  2.92  1.67  1.25 
1978  710  2.62  0.19  2.41  0.40  0.00  2.81  4.92  2.11  1.74  0.37 
1979  718  0.92  0.23  0.69  0.46  0.00  1.15  5.36  4.21  1.78  2.43 
1980  730  1.35  0.08  1.21  0.22  0.00  1.43  5.94  4.51  1.83  2.68 
1981  736  0.01  0.25  -0.11  0.37  0.00  0.26  5.84  5.58  1.95  3.62 
1982  748  1.04  0.59  0.29  1.34  0.00  1.63  5.82  4.19  2.07  2.12 
1983  764  1.98  0.21  1.20  0.99  0.00  2.19  5.84  3.65  2.20  1.45 
1984  777  1.39  0.21  0.99  0.61  0.00  1.60  6.15  4.56  2.27  2.28 
1985  791  0.31  0.62  -0.60  1.52  0.00  0.92  6.28  5.36  2.43  2.93 
1986  818  0.73  0.73  -0.78  2.24  0.00  1.46  5.54  4.08  2.48  1.59 
1987  848  -3.54  0.67  -5.04  2.18  0.00  -2.86  6.27  9.14  2.66  6.47 
1988  869  -5.20  0.56  -5.75  1.11  0.00  -4.64  7.22  11.86  2.86  8.99 
1989  889  -5.26  0.68  -6.66  2.08  0.71  -5.29  8.02  13.31  2.98  10.33 
1990  902  1.02  0.87  -0.48  2.36  1.01  0.87  9.00  8.13  3.24  4.89 
1991  920  -3.48  0.62  -4.84  1.98  0.00  -2.86  8.70  11.56  3.47  8.10 
1992  933  1.93  1.05  1.36  1.62  1.85  1.13  4.88  3.75  0.83  2.92 
1993  945  -3.98  2.94  -9.30  8.26  0.15  -1.19  6.82  8.01  3.51  4.50 
1994  966  0.39  1.55  -0.47  2.41  0.03  1.90  7.20  5.29  3.77  1.53 
1995  983  164.86  0.00  164.86  0.00  161.17  3.69  7.19  3.50  3.82  -0.32 
43 Table 5: Capitalized Cash Flows for 1974-95 as Percents of 1995 Terminal Value 
The table shows the 1995 value of  the annual components of cash flow capitalized at the real 
or nominal IRR on value or cost (Table 3)  and expressed as a percent of the terminal market 
value of  capital (TV  1995) of  the firms in the sample in 1995. FBt is the cost of new firms that 
enter the sample at book value (Cost) or market value (Value). FSt is the market value of firms 
sold from  the  sample before  1995.  Xt=Yt+Dpt>  where Yt is  the  net income before interest 
expense, and Dpt is depreciation expense. IcDpt is the change in book capital from t-l to t and 
investment, It>  is the change in the book capital plus  depreciation.  Thus,  XcIt is  annual  net 
cash flow from operations. A firm's cash flow is included in the aggregate cash flow beginning 
in the year after the firm enters and through the year it leaves the sample. (See more detailed 
definitions in Table 4.) FBcFSc(Xc1t)=100 percent, due to the fact that the IRR equates the 
capitalized cost of  the net corporate investment to the terminal value TV 1995 in 1995. 
IRRon  FB  FS  X-I  X  Dp  I-Dp 
Nominal Cash Flows as Percents orTV  1995 
All non-fmancials  Cost  141.15  2.00  39.25  254.85  215.60  96.17  119.43 
Value  126.53  1.78  24.81  178.57  153.76  68.94  84.82 
Keiret!IU  Cost  156.88  1.34  55.51  283.17  227.66  100.04  127.62 
Value  142.59  1.25  41.26  222.38  181.12  79.73  101.39 
Non-keiretsu  Cost  129.93  3.49  26.41  212.14  185.73  76.62  109.10 
Value  117.62  3.10  14.57  151.17  136.60  55.32  81.28 
Real Cash Flows as Percents or  TV 1995 
All non-fmancials  Cost  133.97  1.82  32.20  217.47  185.27  82.49  102.78 
Value  122.76  1.63  21.04  157.02  135.98  60.88  75.09 
Keiret!IU  Cost  146.12  1.22  44.89  237.61  192.72  84.43  108.29 
Value  135.06  1.15  33.86  189.33  155.47  68.26  87.21 
Non-keiretsu  Cost  124.68  3.18  21.45  182.76  161.31  66.20  95.11 
Value  114.80  2.84  12.04  133.21  121.18  48.87  72.30 
44 Table 6: Japanese Corporate Capital Structures 
Capital Structures of all non-financial fInns (panel A), Keiretsu (panel B), and Non-keiretsu 
fIrms (Panel C) are shown in tenns of  average shares of  different classes of  liabilities measured 
in percents of total market capital for  non-financial fInns in the  sample  at the  end of each 
fIscal year. keiretsu represents the close members of the  Six Major  Industry  Groups.  Non-
keiretsu includes  either unaffiliated fInns  or the  weak  members  of the  Groups,  excluding 
Utilities (Code 0801)  and Communications (0705).  Market  capital  is  the total  end-of-year 
book value of  short-tenn debt (pACAP's data item BALlI) and long-term debt (BAL14 and 
BALl5) plus the market value of equity  [(MKTV  AL  or share price (MKT3)  times shares 
outstanding  (MKT5)  at the  end  of March].  Long-term  debt  includes  Long-tenn  Loans 
(BAL14) and Debentures (BAL15) which in turn consist of Bond (JAF50)  and Convertible 
Bonds (JAF5l). 
Year  Common  LTDebt  STDebt 
Stock  Total  Loan  Bond  Convertible 
Bond 
Panel A: All Non-financials 
1974-80  38.39  35.11  26.53  7.04  1.54  26.50 
1981-85  50.57  26.73  18.01  6.91  1.81  22.71 
1986-90  68.31  17.76  8.32  7.40  2.05  13.92 
1991-95  57.58  25.24  11.07  10.96  3.20  17.18 
1974-95  52.32  27.02  16.94  7.98  2.09  20.66 
Panel B: Keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  36.92  34.41  27.43  5.27  1.70  28.67 
1981-85  49.63  25.79  18.60  5.37  1.82  24.58 
1986-90  65.62  18.03  9.06  6.83  2.14  16.35 
1991-95  55.20  25.42  11.16  10.91  3.35  19.38 
1974-95  50.49  26.69  17.55  6.93  2.20  22.83 
Panel C: Non-keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  45.13  27.86  23.61  2.57  1.68  27.00 
1981-85  58.64  18.40  13.25  2.83  2.33  22.96 
1986-90  72.73  13.19  5.98  4.75  2.46  14.08 
1991-95  63.05  19.64  9.10  7.11  3.42  17.31 
1974-95  58.55  20.51  13.95  4.16  2.40  20.94 
45 Table 7:  Cash 1n- and Outflows, Retained Cash Earnings, and Free Cash Flows 
The table shows the average arumal  cash in- and outflows,  retained cash earnings,  and free 
cash flows as percents of aggregate year-start book capital. Components of the cash in- and 
outflows and combinations of  the components like retained cash earnings and free cash flows 
are expressed as percents of  cash inflows, which balance cash outflows: 
Yt+Dpt+dSt+dLTDt+dSTDt=It+Divt+Intt 
Yt is the sum of  net income (PACAP's data item INC9) and interest expense (JAF67), Dpt is 
depreciation expense (JAF74). dL  TDt is the change in the book value of  the sum of long-term 
loans (BALI4) and debenture (BALIS) from t-l to t. dSTDt is the change in the book value of 
short-term debt (BALlI). Investment,  It,  is the change in book capital from  t-l  to  t,  plus 
depreciation. Intt is interest expense (JAF67). Divt is  dividend [dividend per share (MKTl) 
times shares outstanding (MKTS)].  The net flow from the  sale  and  repurchase  of stock, 
dSt=It+Divt+Intc YcDpcdSTDt-dL  TDt>  balances  the  cash  flow  identity.  The  retained  cash 
earnings,  RCEt=Yt+DpcDivcIntt>  or  RCEt=IcdScdLTDcdSTDt.  The  free  cash  flow, 
FCFt=Yt+DpcIntcIt. 
Year  Y  Dp  dS  dLTD  dSTD  I  Div  Int  RCE  FCF 
PanelA: AIINon-flllancials 
1975-80  10.94  5.31  0.36  3.15  1.81  12.41  1.37  7.80  7.09  -3.95 
1981-85  10.32  6.03  0.31  1.77  1.99  12.33  1.38  6.72  8.26  -2.69 
1986-90  8.14  6.38  1.36  3.85  1.73  15.71  1.31  4.44  8.77  -5.63 
1991-95  5.03  4.80  1.50  0.81  0.20  8.39  0.84  3.11  5.88  -1.67 
1975-95  8.72  5.62  0.86  2.43  1.45  12.22  1.23  5.621  7.48  -3.51 
Panel B: Keiretsu Firms 
1975-80  11.09  4.91  0.15  2.69  1.84  11.27  1.25  8.16  6.59  -3.43 
1981-85  10.59  5.72  0.26  1.59  1.99  11.81  1.26  7.08  7.98  -2.58 
1986-90  8.30  5.79  1.43  3.95  1.99  15.52  1.23  4.70  8.15  -6.14 
1991-95  5.02  4.34  1.57  0.67  -0.26  7.31  0.84  3.18  5.33  -1.14 
1975-95  8.86  5.18  0.82  2.25  1.41  11.47  1.15  5.901  6.99  -3.33 
Panel C: Non-keiretsu Firms 
1975-80  11.19  5.50  0.89  1.37  1.75  11.79  1.47  7.44  7.79  -2.54 
1981-85  10.16  5.81  0.80  1.17  2.16  12.49  1.51  6.09  8.36  -2.62 
1986-90  7.87  5.24  2.20  4.89  1.82  16.91  1.43  3.69  7.99  -7.49 
1991-95  4.76  3.69  1.68  0.43  0.99  8.02  0.90  2.62  4.93  -2.19 
1975-95  8.62  5.08  1.37  1.94  1.68  12.28  1.33  5.081  7.29  -3.65 
46 Table 8: Dividend Yield and Payout Ratio (in Percent) for 1975-95 
The table shows  the average  annual  dividend  yield  (DivlPrice)  of stocks  and  the  average 
annual  dividend payout  ratio  (Div/Earnings)  in all  non-financial  firms,  keiretsu,  and  non-
keiretsu firms.  The  aggregate  dividend yield is  defined as  (value-weight)  aggregate  dividend 
_Dividend  per share (MKTl) times shares outstanding (MKT3)]  over the aggregate market 
equity  _[MKTV  AL  or  share  price  (MKT3)  times  shares  outstanding  (MKTS)]  at  the 
beginning of  the fiscal year. 
Year  Dividend Yield  Payout RatiJ 
Non-Financials  Keiretsu  Non-Keiretsu  Non-Hnancials  Keiretsu  Non-Keiretsu 
1981-85  2.05  1.86  1.84  0.38  0.36  0.37 
1986-90  0.89  0.91  0.85  0.36  0.35  0.35 
1991-95  0.91  0.99  0.84  0.44  0.48  0.43 
1975-95  1.74  1.69  1.56  0.41  0.41  0.39 
47 Table 9: Forms of Financing as Percents of Investment 
The table shows the average annual retained cash earnings, raised equity and debt as percents 
of  the investment they [mance: 
I t=RCEt+dSt+dL TDt+dSTDto 
Investment,  Ito  is  the  change in book capital from  t-l  to  t,  plus  depreciation expense, Dpt 
(PACAP's data item JAF74). The retained cash earnings, RCEt=Yt+DpcDivt-Intto where Yt is 
the sum of  net income (PACAP's data item INC9) and interest expense, Intt (JAF67) and Div 
is dividend _[dividend per share (MKTl) times shares  outstanding (MKTS)].  dLTD  is  the 
change in the book value of  the sum oflong-term bank loans (BALI4), dLTL, and debentures 
(BALlS) from t-l to t. The newly issued debenture consists of straight bonds, dBD (JAFSO) 
and convertible bonds, dCBD (lAFSI). dSTDt is the change in the book value of short-term 
debt (BALlI). The net flow from the sale and repurchase of  stock, dSt=It-RCEcdLTDt-dSTDt 
balances the cash flow identity. 
Year  RCE  dS  dLTD  dSTD 
TOTAL  dLTL  dBD  dCBD 
Panel A: All Non-financials 
1975-80  61.51  2.80  21.52  9.06  10.02  2.41  14.16 
1981-85  69.54  0.65  13.52  1.67  9.63  2.19  16.28 
1986-90  57.06  8.33  24.49  4.44  14.44  5.61  10.13 
1991-95  77.93  15.23  5.48  5.51  -1.49  1.44  1.36 
1975-95  66.27  6.56  16.50  5.36  8.24  2.89  10.66 
Panel B: Keiretsu Finns 
1975-80  66.07  0.93  17.06  7.09  7.97  1.99  15.93 
1981-85  70.12  -0.01  12.94  -0.14  11.27  1.79  16.95 
1986-90  53.71  8.54  24.91  1.82  16.97  6.12  12.84 
1991-95  88.82  18.00  4.20  4.21  -1.35  1.34  -11.02 
1975-95  69.51  6.58  14.89  3.43  8.68  2.77  9.02 
Panel C: Non-keiretsu Firms 
1975-80  72.30  7.82  5.95  -1.96  3.25  4.60  13.93 
1981-85  68.92  5.10  8.42  -2.94  7.77  3.52  17.56 
1986-90  52.48  12.54  29.16  5.94  17.58  5.63  5.82 
1991-95  73.73  16.22  -4.55  3.72  -10.42  2.12  14.60 














Figure 1: IRR on value and cost in JPY. 
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49 